1. Introduction

The policy of prisoner releases in Cuba has traditionally been presented as a manifestation of state clemency and a legitimate mechanism for administering justice. However, a detailed analysis of its evolution between 1998 and 2026 reveals that these processes transcend the strictly legal sphere and are embedded in broader dynamics of penal control, internal political management, and international diplomacy. As explained in the background document of this report, pardons, extra-penal licenses, and other forms of release have historically been linked to specific circumstances, such as papal visits, bilateral negotiation processes, or internal crises, suggesting a strategic use of state clemency as a governance tool. In this context, release cannot be understood solely as an act of liberation, but rather as a mechanism that reconfigures—and in many cases prolongs—the relationship of control between the state and the sanctioned individual.

The Cuban regulatory framework, particularly since the 2019 Constitution and the 2022 Penal Code, establishes various ways to extinguish criminal liability, as well as mechanisms to make the execution of the sentence more flexible.¹Cubalex. (2026, February 4). Political prisoners in Cuba: the legal differences between amnesty and pardon; and National Assembly of People's Power. (2019). Constitution of the Republic of Cuba. Official Gazette No. 5 Extraordinary of April 10, 2019 However, empirical evidence shows that mechanisms that imply full freedom, such as amnesty, have been used only exceptionally, while those that maintain the legal link with the convicted person, such as pardon or early release, predominate. This normative and practical preference is not neutral: it determines the quality of the freedom granted and allows the State to retain tools for supervision, revocation, and control over released individuals. Thus, release from prison is configured as a graduated process, where leaving prison does not necessarily imply the full restoration of rights.

Over the past few decades, prison release processes have shown consistent patterns of selectivity, opacity, and conditionality. Mass releases linked to international events, diplomatic agreements that include the release of incarcerated individuals, and the use of prison benefits instead of mechanisms for extinguishing sentences point to a logic in which freedom is strategically managed. This logic is reinforced by the lack of transparency in the publication of beneficiary lists, the absence of verifiable selection criteria, and the imposition of conditions that limit the exercise of fundamental rights after release from prison. Consequently, release does not always represent the end of the criminal process, but rather its transformation into less visible, yet equally effective, forms of control.

In this context, this report aims to comprehensively analyze the forms of prisoner release in Cuba, examining both their legal basis and their practical application, as well as their human rights implications. The study seeks to identify existing types of release, assess the degree of actual freedom they generate, and document patterns of political and selective use of these measures. Furthermore, it aims to provide a more precise understanding of the phenomenon, differentiating between the various forms of release and challenging official narratives that present these processes as humanitarian gestures or exceptional concessions.

This report begins with a fundamental premise: not all release from prison equates to freedom. Based on this idea, it examines the mechanisms by which the Cuban state manages release from prison, the conditions surrounding these processes, and the real effects they have on the lives of those released. Ultimately, the analysis aims to contribute to the debate on the role of the penal system in authoritarian contexts and to offer conceptual and empirical tools for critically evaluating release policies from a human rights perspective.

2. The regulation of prison releases in Cuba

According to the 2022 Criminal Code, criminal liability is extinguished under a series of circumstances ranging from the offender's personal circumstances to procedural benefits. As stipulated in the law, the main causes include the offender's death, the dissolution of the legal entity, and full compliance with the imposed sentence. Liability also ceases upon the expiration of the probationary period in the case of conditional release from prison, through an acquittal in a review proceeding, or upon the expulsion of the foreigner as provided for in Article 54.2 of the Criminal Code.²The conditional remission of deprivation of liberty It is a benefit that allows the court to leave unexecuted a prison sentence of up to five years when it is considered that the person can be socially reintegrated without going to prison. It does not mean absolution or immediate removal of the sanction: the person remains subject to a probation The sentence is one to five years, and the offender must comply with the obligations imposed by the court. If these conditions are met, the sentence may be extinguished; if the offender commits another crime, fails to fulfill their duties, or continues to misconduct, the court may order the sentence to be carried out. This procedure is regulated in the Chapter IX, “Conditional remission of the sanction”, Article 88 of Law 151/2022, Penal Code. All articles of the Cuban Penal Code cited in this report can be consulted at the National Assembly of People's Power. (2022). Law 151/2022. Penal Code. Official Gazette No. 93 Ordinary of September 1, 2022

From a strictly legal and procedural standpoint, the causes of extinction include the statute of limitations—both for the criminal action and the penalty—and the withdrawal of the complaint by the plaintiff or complainant in cases where the special part of the Code so determines. Similarly, extinction is contemplated through the application of criteria of opportunity or through the completion of the probationary period in a conditional dismissal.
Finally, amnesty and pardon are included as determining causes. According to Article 92.1, the former has the power to extinguish the sanction and all its effects; however, this does not extend to civil liability, unless the specific law provides otherwise.³The statute of limitations for criminal prosecution This means that if the time stipulated by law elapses without the State validly exercising criminal prosecution or without it progressing in the terms foreseen, the possibility of judging the crime is extinguished. The statute of limitations for the sanction, On the other hand, it means that, once a final sentence has been imposed, the State loses the possibility of executing it if the time period established by law passes without taking action. In both cases, the calculation can be interrupted by certain legally prescribed actions and restart from zero. These procedures are regulated in the Title VII, “Extinction of criminal liability”, articles 96 and 97 of the Law 151/2022, Penal Code, and constitute causes of extinction of criminal liability also recognized in the Article 90 of the Code itself. complainant is the offended or harmed person who presents and maintains a complaint before the court to initiate criminal proceedings in those crimes whose prosecution depends on private initiative. In other words, it is not the person who merely reports an incident, but the one who formally acts as the prosecuting party in the proceedings. Law 143/2021, on Criminal Procedure, It stipulates that in crimes prosecutable at the request of a private party, criminal action is exercised exclusively through a complaint, and also recognizes that the complainant may withdraw from that action before a judgment is issued. See Articles 437, 700, 701 and 704 of the Law of Criminal Procedure. The opportunity criteria These are cases in which the Criminal Procedure Law authorizes the prosecutor to to forgo presenting the case to the court and to refrain from exercising criminal action, even when a punishable act has occurred, provided the legal requirements are met. They generally apply to crimes committed through negligence or intentional crimes punishable by up to five years' imprisonment, and produce extinctive effect of public criminal action, so the case cannot be brought before the court later. For this to happen, the law requires, among other things, the defendant's consent, hearing the victim or injured party, and that the damage has been repaired, agreed upon, or waived. conditional dismissal, For its part, it is a form of conditional termination of the process that the prosecutor requests from the court when he considers that the end of the punishment can be achieved without initiating criminal proceedings, but subjecting the accused to a probation from one to two years and compliance with certain restrictions or measures. If that period is satisfactorily completed, the court orders the case to be dismissed. extinction of criminal liability; If this condition is not met, the dismissal may be revoked and the criminal proceedings resumed. These consequences are provided for in the Articles 17, 18, 19, 419, 420, 421 and 422 of the Law 143/2021, on Criminal Procedure, in relation to the Article 95 of the Law 151/2022, Penal Code.

In cases of multiple offenses, Article 92.2 clarifies that the convicted person will only be considered amnestied when the relevant law expressly includes all the offenses comprising the concurrence. If any offense is not covered by the amnesty, the individual must serve the corresponding sentence for that remaining offense.⁴He royal competition This occurs when the same person commits several different crimes, through separate shares, and each person is punished separately. Then, the court combines those sentences into one joint sanction in accordance with the rules established by law. In simple terms: it is not a single event with multiple consequences, but rather several separate crimes committed by the same person. Therefore, if an amnesty does not include all the crimes that make up that concurrence, the person is not completely amnestied and must continue to serve the corresponding sentence for the crime that was left out.

Regarding pardons, Article 93.1 establishes that this measure only extinguishes the principal penalty, leaving accessory penalties intact unless these are explicitly included in the benefit granted. Finally, according to Article 93.2, a pardon does not automatically include civil liability or the expungement of criminal records. For these latter effects to take place, the pardon must be definitive, and the consequences must be expressly stated in the corresponding legal provision.

Regarding pardons, the provisions of the law adopted in 1919 must also be considered. This law regulates the power of the President of the Republic of Cuba to grant pardons, establishing the different types (total, partial, conditional, and definitive) and the requirements for granting them. It defines who may be eligible and excludes certain cases, such as officials convicted of crimes committed in the exercise of their duties or individuals without a final sentence. The law establishes a formal procedure that includes the involvement of the courts, reports on the offender's conduct, and the consideration of factors such as justice, equity, and public interest. Furthermore, it regulates the conditions of the pardon (for example, its revocation in cases of recidivism) and requires specific conditions for its granting, such as partial completion of the sentence or reparation of damages. Overall, the law establishes the pardon as an exceptional measure of grace or state forgiveness, subject to legal and political criteria, and with an institutionalized procedure involving both the executive and judicial branches.⁵Senate of the Republic of Cuba. (1919). Pardon Law of August 15, 1919. Florida International University College of Law eCollections. Its content is important because it served as the basis for the pardons granted in Cuba in 2011 and 2015.⁶Council of State. (2011). Decree No. 1/2011. Official Gazette No. 47 Extraordinary of December 24, 2011; and Council of State. (2015). Decree No. 1/2015. Official Gazette No. 31 Extraordinary of September 11, 2015.

Regarding parole, Article 89.1 of the Penal Code empowers the court to grant parole to individuals sentenced to temporary imprisonment or correctional labor with confinement. This measure is not an automatic right, but rather a discretionary power based on a comprehensive evaluation: the court must consider both the individual circumstances of the offender and their behavior during the period of incarceration. The granting of this benefit is based on the existence of well-founded reasons to believe that the individual has reformed and that the purposes of the sentence have been satisfactorily fulfilled without the need to serve the full term of the sentence.

However, the regulations establish different standards of rigor depending on the severity and social harm of certain offenses. According to Article 89.2, the court has the exceptional power to set a more stringent time requirement in the sentence for the assessment of parole. This special regime applies, though not exhaustively, to crimes against state security, acts of terrorism, crimes related to administrative and economic corruption, trafficking in illicit drugs or substances with similar effects, organized crime, and crimes against life. In these cases, or when the social harm of the act justifies it, the court may determine that the convicted person must serve two-thirds or more of the imposed sentence of temporary deprivation of liberty before their application for parole can even be evaluated.⁷The expression “in a non-exhaustive manner” This means that the list of crimes mentioned in that article It is neither closed nor exhaustive. In other words, the law lists some scenarios as examples, but This does not preclude the possibility that the same regime could be applied to other crimes. Yes, because of its characteristics or its high social harm, the court considers it justified to impose that stricter requirement to assess parole.

Consideration should also be given to the provisions of the Criminal Execution Law adopted in 2021, since it establishes the conditions for granting parole, as well as extra-penal license, two modalities used by the Cuban authorities during the release processes.

Parole is defined as an early release benefit granted by the Provincial People's Court in the territory where the offender is located. This measure is based on an evaluation of the individual's circumstances and behavior, requiring well-founded reasons to consider that the individual has reformed and that the purposes of the sentence have been achieved. Article 144 establishes specific time limits for granting parole: one-third of the sentence for first-time female offenders and young people under 20 years of age; one-half for first-time male offenders; and two-thirds for repeat offenders.

Exceptionally, those sentenced to life imprisonment may only opt for this benefit after serving 30 years of their sentence. Furthermore, a financial requirement is that the beneficiary has paid at least half of the amount set for civil liability, except in highly justified circumstances.⁸All articles of the Criminal Enforcement Law cited in this report can be consulted at the National Assembly of People's Power. (2022). Law 152/2022. Criminal Enforcement Law. Official Gazette No. 94 Ordinary of September 1, 2022.

On the other hand, extra-penal leave constitutes a different type of release permit, primarily motivated by health conditions, disabilities, or other extraordinary circumstances that hinder compliance with the sentence. Unlike parole, this measure can be granted by either the competent court or the Minister of the Interior in cases of urgency. A fundamental restriction of this measure is that it is never granted to individuals sentenced to life imprisonment. In the case of incarcerated women, Article 101 empowers the court to grant this benefit during the prenatal and postnatal periods, coinciding with maternity leave. During the leave period, the time spent is credited toward the end of the sentence, and the individual remains under the supervision of the enforcement judge.⁹The expression “it is paid at the end of the sanction” means that The time during which the person remains on extra-penal leave counts as part of the fulfillment of the sentence. In other words, that period is neither lost nor added later, but rather is deducted from the total time of the imposed sanction, even if the person is not physically in prison during that time.

Both statuses are subject to a strict control and revocability regime. Both those released on parole and those granted an extra-penal license are subject to the supervision of the enforcement judge, the National Revolutionary Police, and the social prevention and assistance agencies in their place of residence. The court retains the power to revoke these benefits if the sanctioned individual fails to comply with the imposed obligations, does not demonstrate good conduct, or is convicted of a new crime, ordering in such cases their immediate return to the penitentiary to serve the remaining time of their sentence.

Table 1. Types of releases from prison

Type of release	Main legal basis	What effect does it have on the sanction?	What kind of freedom does it leave?	Does it erase criminal records?
Amnesty	Penal Code, art. 92.1	It extinguishes the sanction and all its effects, unless the law provides otherwise with respect to civil liability.	Full freedom, because it breaks more completely with the criminal sanction.	Yeah
Pardon	Penal Code, art. 93.1 and 93.2	It extinguishes the main sanction, but does not automatically eliminate accessory sanctions, civil liability or criminal records, unless expressly provided.	Limited or incomplete freedom, because the person is released from serving the main sentence, but other legal effects may remain.	No, unless expressly provided.
Probation	Penal Code, art. 89.1	It does not extinguish the sentence. It allows the sentence to be completed outside of prison, under conditions and state control.	Controlled freedom, because the person is released from prison, but remains subject to surveillance, revocation, and restrictions.	No
Extra-penal license	Criminal Enforcement Law, art. 101 for the pre- and postnatal case	It does not extinguish the sanction. It temporarily suspends or makes more flexible its enforcement outside the prison for reasons of health, disability, or other extraordinary circumstances.	Conditional and exceptional freedom, because the person is released from prison, but remains bound by the sentence and under judicial control.	No

3. Releases from prison in Cuba beyond what is established in the legislation

If this phenomenon is analyzed in the Cuban context from a legal and, in particular, functional perspective, the first thing that emerges is that it is not a single or homogeneous category, but rather a set of mechanisms with profoundly different natures, effects, and purposes, according to the methods of release employed, as well as the underlying political interests. An example of the latter is the exclusion of releases of individuals deprived of their liberty not only for political reasons, as is the case with those convicted of crimes against authority in the pardon announced on April 2, but also for reasons of penal policy, as occurs with those convicted of robbery with violence or force. To explain as clearly as possible the political and legal tensions surrounding the phenomenon of releases in Cuba, these have been classified into three groups. These criteria for classification—total extinction of criminal liability, release without extinction of the sentence, and mixed or political-administrative forms—allow us to organize the phenomenon, but also reveal a structural tension between the legal and the political. Not all releases from prison mean the same thing, nor do they produce the same degree of freedom, nor do they respond to the same institutional logic.¹⁰Consult: Cubalex. (2025, March 8). Early release in Cuba: Lack of transparency and political use of the judicial system. Cubalex. (2025, April 30). Parole without guarantees, arbitrary revocation, and enforced disappearances: The case of Félix Navarro and José Daniel Ferrer demands urgent international action. Cubalex. (2025, January 15). Cubalex denounces lack of transparency and guarantees in the release of sanctioned individuals in Cuba. Cubalex. (2025, May 1). Cuba without legal guarantees: Revocation of parole as a form of political repression.

3.1. Total extinction of criminal liability

The forms of total extinction of criminal liability represent, in theory, the clearest scenario from the perspective of classical criminal law. In these cases—amnesty, pardon, completion of sentence, prescription, or acquittal on review—the legal relationship between the State and the sanctioned person is definitively modified. However, even within this seemingly homogeneous category, substantial differences exist. 

Amnesty, for example, implies a radical break with punitive logic, by eliminating not only the sanction but also its effects, which implies an implicit recognition that the act should not be considered as constituting a crime and, therefore, there should be no criminal sanction.

In contrast, a pardon, while extinguishing the sentence, preserves the legal stigma of the crime, resulting in a form of incomplete freedom marked by the persistence of criminal records and a state narrative that fails to review the legitimacy of the conviction. In this sense, even among the various forms of sentence termination, the quality of freedom is not uniform.

3.2. Release from prison without extinction of the sanction

Even more complex is the second category: forms of release without the extinction of the sentence. Herein lies the core of the actual functioning of the penal system in contemporary practice. Measures such as parole, non-custodial leave, or sentence substitution do not eliminate the punishment, but rather transform its execution. The individual leaves the physical space of the prison, but remains legally subject to the punitive power of the State. This continuity is expressed in control mechanisms, the possibility of revocation, and the existence of conditions whose breach may imply a return to incarceration. From an analytical perspective, these forms introduce a key distinction between “formal freedom” and “material freedom”: the prison is left behind, but not the surveillance system. This raises important questions for debate, especially in contexts where these measures are applied selectively or arbitrarily.¹¹The formal freedom It refers to the cessation of physical confinement: the person leaves the penitentiary, but may remain legally subject to the sentence, conditions of compliance, state supervision, and the possibility of revocation. material freedom, In contrast, it refers to the effective enjoyment of liberty, understood as the real possibility of exercising rights and carrying out daily life without an intense surveillance regime, without disproportionate restrictions, and without the constant threat of re-imprisonment. In this sense, a person may regain formal freedom upon leaving prison and yet not achieve full material freedom if they remain subject to control mechanisms that substantially limit their autonomy and the exercise of their rights.

3.3. Mixed or political-administrative forms

This category is probably the most revealing for understanding the true workings of the system in Cuba. Here, prison release ceases to be merely a legal institution and becomes an instrument of political management. Mass pardons, negotiated releases, conditional releases on exile, and prisoner exchanges demonstrate that legal mechanisms can be used for purposes that transcend the strictly penal framework. In these cases, the law operates as a vehicle for political decisions, often linked to contexts of international negotiations, external pressure, or the need to reconfigure internal control. This does not mean that these measures lack a legal basis, but rather that their application is not explained solely by legal criteria, but also by strategic variables, in which the State does not even make transparent the legal criteria employed.

Upon closer examination of the typology, it becomes clear that the differences are not only formal but also substantive. Releases due to the extinction of the sentence create scenarios close to full freedom, although with important nuances in the case of a pardon. Releases from prison, on the other hand, are part of the execution of the sentence and should be understood as mechanisms for mitigating punishment, not eliminating it. Releases resulting from judicial management introduce an additional level of complexity, as they depend on technical decisions within the execution process. Finally, de facto or political releases demonstrate that the system can operate outside of a strictly normative logic, adapting to specific circumstances.

From a functional perspective—particularly useful for documentation and analysis work—this diversity of mechanisms allows us to identify different types of freedom:

• Full release, associated with amnesty, implies a restoration of rights and a break with the sanction. 
• Limited release from prison, as in a pardon, results in a legally incomplete freedom. 
• Controlled release, typical of parole or non-penal leave, keeps the individual within a system of supervision. Instrumental release reveals the strategic use of criminal law, while apparent or simulated release challenges the state narrative when situations that actually stem from previously acquired rights are presented as exceptional gestures.

All of this leads to a conclusion that is central to the debate: in the Cuban context, release from prison cannot be understood solely as a legal act of liberation. Rather, it is a complex mechanism where norms, institutional practices, and political decisions intersect. The freedom it produces is not unequivocal, but rather graduated, conditional, and, in many cases, reversible. Therefore, analyzing release from prison involves asking not only whether a person is released, but under what conditions, what relationship they maintain with the penal system, and what the significance of that release is in terms of control, legitimacy, and state power.

Table 2. Distinctions between legal categories

Category	Does the sanction expire?	What does this mean in practice for the person deprived of their liberty?	Legal figures
Full extinction of criminal liability	Yeah. The sanction and, according to the figure, its effects cease definitively.	The person ceases to be subject to punishment and regains the highest degree of legal freedom.	Amnesty Compliance with sanction  Statute of limitations for the penalty Acquittal on review
Extinction of the sanction with limited effects	Yeah, but not in the same way as amnesty.	The person is released from serving the main sentence, but criminal records, accessory sanctions, or other legal effects may remain.	Pardon
Release from prison without termination of the sentence	No. The sanction remains in effect; only the way it is enforced has changed.	The person is released from prison, but remains under state control, with surveillance, conditions, and risk of re-entry.	Probation  Extra-penal license Change in the way the sentence is served
Mixed or political-administrative forms	It depends on the figure used. The decisive factor here is not only the legal effect, but the political logic of its application.	Prison release also functions as an instrument of negotiation, pressure, or political management.	Mass pardons Negotiated releases  Exchanges of prisoners  Releases conditioned on exile

4. Some specific cases

If we incorporate concrete examples into the analysis, what becomes clearer is that the different forms of release in Cuba not only exist on the normative level, but have been consistently applied in specific contexts, revealing patterns of political, selective and strategic use of the penal system.

In the case of methods for the complete extinction of criminal liability, the most relevant example in recent practice is not amnesty—which is practically never used—but rather pardon, albeit with particular characteristics. An illustrative case is the mass pardon approved on September 11, 2015, when the Council of State granted 3,522 pardons in the context of Pope Francis's visit.¹²14ymedio. (2015, September 11). The Council of State grants 3,522 pardons ahead of Pope Francis' arrival. Infobae. (2015, April 22). What were the visits of John Paul II and Benedict XVI to Cuba like?.  This event was not isolated, but part of a pattern: in 1998, with the visit of John Paul II, 299 prisoners were pardoned, and in 2012, with the visit of Benedict XVI, almost 3,000 were released.¹³Cubadebate. (2011, December 28). Cuba publishes names of those pardoned (+ Gazette). This pattern has even clearer precedents in the 1978–1979 process, when, as a result of dialogue between the Cuban government and sectors of the exile community, the release of approximately 3,600 political prisoners was agreed upon through pardons, often accompanied by authorization to leave the country for the United States or other destinations. This precedent reveals that, from early stages, pardons have been linked to political negotiation processes and solutions that combine release with forced or induced displacement, thus constituting what can be understood as a mixed form of release.¹⁴Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. (1979). Report on the situation of political prisoners in Cuba: Chapter IV. Recent developments concerning political prisoners. Organization of American States.

Another set of examples that the analysis delves deeper into is that of pardons granted based on internal selective criteria. The pardon of July 19, 2019, which benefited 2,604 inmates, illustrates how this selectivity operates. Only individuals who had already served at least one-third of their sentence were included, prioritizing women, young people, and the elderly, while excluding those convicted of serious crimes and repeat offenders.¹⁵14ymedio. (2019, July 19). The Government pardons more than 2,600 prisoners. But there is an even more relevant detail: it was not reported whether any of those pardoned were dissidents or political prisoners. Furthermore, certain criminal categories that are commonly used against opponents, such as broad public order offenses, were excluded. This reinforces a key hypothesis: the formal design of the pardon includes technical criteria (age, conduct, time served), but its actual application maintains an implicit political filter.

More recently, in April 2026, the Cuban government announced another pardon of 2,010 prisoners during Holy Week, presented as a “humanitarian gesture”.¹⁶EFE. (April 3, 2026). The Cuban government announces the pardon of 2,010 prisoners. SWI swissinfo.ch. Granma. (2026, April 2). Cuban government announces decision to pardon more than 2,000 sanctioned individuals. September 5th. These examples show that the pardon, far from functioning as a regular tool of criminal justice, appears linked to political circumstances, especially international or religious events, which reinforces its instrumental character.

However, the analysis becomes most in-depth regarding forms of release without the extinction of the sentence, which are the most commonly used in practice. A prime example is the process of releases initiated in 2010 following the dialogue between the Cuban government, the Catholic Church, and the Spanish government. Between 2010 and 2011, more than 100 political prisoners were freed, in many cases under the guise of extra-penal license or conditional release, and frequently conditioned on exile. A specific case is that of Iván Hernández Carrillo, an independent journalist sentenced to 25 years in prison during the Black Spring of 2003, whose release in February 2011 was anticipated to be under extra-penal license. This type of release perfectly illustrates the concept of "conditional release": the person leaves prison, but the sentence remains in effect and can be reinstated.¹⁷RTVE.es & EFE. (2011, February 20). Cuba releases another prisoner of conscience from the Group of 75 who rejects exile in Spain. Cubaencuentro. (2011, February 19). Church announces release of another prisoner from the 75.

This same pattern is observed in the final releases of the Group of 75. On March 23, 2011, the release of the last two prisoners in this group, Félix Navarro and José Daniel Ferrer, both sentenced to 25 years in prison, was announced. These releases were part of a gradual process that began in July 2010, characterized by a trickle of releases that extended over months and, in many cases, was conditional on leaving the country. Here, the combination of legal mechanisms with political objectives is clearly seen: release did not necessarily imply a full restoration of rights, but rather a reconfiguration of control, even through territorial displacement (exile).¹⁸Ladies in White. (2011, March 23). Cuba announces the release of the last two political prisoners from the Group of 75.

Mixed or political-administrative forms are evident precisely in these processes. The 2010–2011 releases cannot be understood solely as individual legal decisions, but rather as the result of a tripartite political negotiation (Cuban state, Catholic Church, Spanish government). Similarly, the mass pardons associated with papal visits show that prisoner release functions as a foreign policy instrument, used to project an image of openness or generate diplomatic capital. Even in more recent contexts, such as the releases announced after international mediation or external pressure, this pattern of selectivity and political opportunism is repeated.¹⁹Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cuba. (2023, January 21). Cardinal Beniamino Stella, envoy of Pope Francis, will visit Cuba. Martí News. (2023, April 27). Catholic Church: The door is open to dialogue with the Cuban government regarding the release of prisoners.

Over the past decade, prisoner release processes in Cuba have followed a recurring pattern linked to political circumstances and international negotiations, characterized by the use of mixed mechanisms—such as parole, early release, early release, and, in some cases, departure from the country—without implying recognition of the arbitrariness of the sentences. In 2014–2015, in the context of the restoration of relations between Cuba and the United States during the Obama administration, at least 53 people considered political prisoners were released as part of bilateral agreements.²⁰Associated Press. (2015, January 12). Cuba releases 53 prisoners as part of historic deal with US. PBS NewsHour. This pattern repeated itself in 2025, when the Cuban government announced the release of 553 people in parallel with US foreign policy decisions, in a similarly opaque and conditional process. More recently, in 2026, the release of 51 people was presented as a humanitarian gesture, although it continues to be marked by a lack of transparency, the imposition of restrictive conditions, and the reversible nature of the measures. Taken together, these precedents demonstrate that releases in Cuba do not constitute guarantees of full freedom, but rather instruments of political management that keep those released under state control and perpetuate the cycle of repression.²¹Domínguez, JI (2025, January 19). Obama in 2014 and Biden in 2025: similarities and differences in making changes to policy towards Cuba. Temas Magazine. Amnesty International. (2025, February 17). Cuba: One month after announcements of releases, hundreds of people remain in prison. Cubalex. (2026, March 16). Cubalex Statement on the Announced Release of 51 Persons Deprived of Liberty in Cuba.

Another key element that reinforces the analysis is the reversibility of partial releases. As documented, measures such as parole or early release have been revoked in specific cases, demonstrating that release from prison does not necessarily imply legal stability. This introduces an additional component of control, where freedom is conditioned not only by formal rules but also by behavioral criteria and state evaluation.

Taken together, these examples further support the central idea: in Cuba, release from prison does not primarily function as a mechanism for resolving the criminal conflict, but rather as a flexible tool for managing control. Empirical evidence shows that the most frequently used forms are not those that eliminate the sanction, but those that allow for maintaining an active legal link with the individual, or those that can be strategically activated according to political interests. Therefore, any analysis of release from prison must consider not only the law that regulates it, but also the context in which it is applied, the conditions that accompany it, and the real effects it has on people's freedom.

5. Other recurring patterns

If we continue to delve deeper into the analysis with more empirical evidence, even clearer patterns emerge about how they work the different forms of release from prison in Cuban practice, especially when observing contexts of crisis or intensified social control.

One particularly revealing case is that of the releases from prison during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. According to official statements, the Cuban penal system granted more than 10,000 early release benefits in a few months. These measures were not pardons or amnesties, but were specifically applied under the legal framework of parole and extra-penal license. Here are several concrete examples within that process. In April 2020, 6,579 people were released from prison. Of these, 6,158 received conditional release for “good behavior,” while 421 had their pretrial detention modified because they were awaiting trial. By June 2020, the cumulative total exceeded 10,000 releases, making it one of the largest release processes in the country's recent history.²²Castro, Y. (2020, June 7). Justice, in the middle ground (+Video). Granma. Daily News of Cuba. (2020, June 17). More than 10,000 Cuban prisoners were released during the pandemic, according to the regime..

This case is key because it demonstrates that mass releases can occur without extinguishing the sentence, serving as a crisis management tool, such as the health crisis in this case, while maintaining the criminal link intact, since the beneficiaries remain under legal control. However, the most important aspect for the analysis is that these measures were not applied uniformly. According to the documented context, political prisoners were not the primary beneficiaries, confirming the selective nature of the use of these mechanisms.

If we compare this with other types of sanctions applied during the same period, the instrumental nature of the system becomes even clearer. For example, during the pandemic itself, between March and April 2020, the courts sanctioned at least 113 people for violating health measures. Of these, 63 were sentenced to prison, 26 to probation, and 24 to fines. On a larger scale, by June 4, 2020, 1,360 trials had been held, resulting in the imprisonment of 1,089 people. This contrast is fundamental to the analysis: while thousands of people are being released from prison, the use of incarceration is intensifying in other sectors. This indicates that the release of prisoners does not reflect a logic of reducing the burden on the penal system, but rather a selective redistribution of penal control.²³Diario de Cuba. (2020, June 8). More than a thousand people imprisoned for the trials held in Cuba during the pandemic. Radio Havana Cuba. (2020, April 16). Courts in Cuba act rigorously against indiscipline in the face of COVID-19. Escambray.

If we integrate all these examples, the analysis becomes more robust and allows us to identify three structural patterns. The first pattern is the mass release of prisoners as a management tool (not a justice tool). A clear example was in 2020, when more than 10,000 prisoners were released due to COVID-19. The main function of this measure was to reduce internal pressure, whether health-related or institutional, and not to recognize rights. The second pattern focuses on the selective release based on the profile of the convicted person. This was observed in 2019 with the pardon of 2,604 people, where certain profiles were excluded. Historically, political prisoners have been systematically excluded or made invisible in these types of processes. Finally, the third pattern is the coexistence of early release and intensive incarceration. In 2020, while thousands of people were released from prison, thousands more were convicted in expedited trials. The function of this pattern is to reorganize penal control, rather than reduce it.

By incorporating these new examples into the analysis, it becomes even more evident that prisoner release in Cuba cannot be understood solely as a legal institution, but rather as a complex phenomenon involving legal, administrative, and political decisions. A key element reinforcing this idea is the role of international negotiation in the release processes. In March 2026, the Cuban government announced the release of 51 people following an agreement with the Vatican, amidst international pressure and tensions with the United States.²⁴SWI swissinfo.ch. (2026, March 13). The Cuban government announces the release of 51 prisoners following an agreement with the Vatican.. Although the measure was presented as a sovereign and humanitarian decision, the statement itself makes it clear that it was not a pardon, but a benefit that allows leaving the penitentiary without extinguishing the sanction. 

However, the selective logic of the system becomes clearer when this announcement is compared with the pardon published by Granma on April 2, 2026. In that official text, the Government specified that the list of those pardoned excluded, among other categories, people sanctioned for crimes against authority, as well as certain cases of theft,²⁵Although the official statement published by Granma indicated that those sanctioned by “robbery with violence or force using weapons or with minor victims”, The first journalistic coverage of the releases documented the liberation of people convicted of heist; For example, The Country It was reported that among the first released prisoners were inmates convicted of common crimes “such as robbery or bribery.” This suggests, at the very least, a lack of public clarity regarding the actual scope of the announced exclusions and reinforces criticism of the opacity with which these processes are implemented. Recidivism and multiple recidivism. Read alongside previous pardons—such as the one in 2019—this data reveals a relevant continuity: the release processes are presented through apparently penitentiary or humanitarian criteria, but they retain prior exclusion filters that are functional to political control, especially when they encompass criminal types that, in Cuban practice, have been used recurrently against people who oppose or criticize the government.²⁶Granma. (2026, April 2). Cuban government announces decision to pardon more than 2,000 sanctioned individuals. This confirms that, even when release occurs in scenarios of diplomatic negotiation, the State preserves the criminal link, keeping open the possibility of control and reversal.

This pattern is not isolated but is repeated in other recent processes where prisoner release appears linked to external political dynamics. In January 2025, Cuban authorities announced the release of 553 people as part of the Ordinary Jubilee Year and following talks with Pope Francis. However, the implementation of the process was marked by opacity, a lack of transparency, and the absence of clear criteria. Human rights organizations documented that only a portion of these releases initially materialized, and that most people were released under conditions such as parole, not through mechanisms that implied full freedom. Furthermore, it was found that many of these individuals, particularly those linked to the protests of July 11, 2021, continued to face restrictions on the exercise of their rights after leaving prison, demonstrating that the release did not represent a break with the control system, but rather a reconfiguration of it.²⁷Amnesty International. (2025, February 17). Cuba: One month after announcements of releases, hundreds of people remain in prison.

Table 3. Degrees of control and political utility of the figures of release from prison

Legal figures  (type of release)	Political utility for the State	How much control does the State retain over the individual?	What is it usually used for?
Mass pardon	High. It has a strong public impact and can project an image of openness or humanity.	Partial. The main penalty is extinguished, but other legal effects may be maintained, such as criminal records or accessory sanctions, depending on the case.	To gain internal or international legitimacy, especially during papal visits, diplomatic junctures, or scenarios of external pressure.
Early releases (parole or non-penal license)	Very high. They are especially useful because they allow release without completely breaking the punitive bond.	High. The person is released from prison, but remains under surveillance, conditions, possibility of revocation, and state control.	To negotiate, manage crises, reduce pressure on the prison system, or release people without acknowledging the arbitrariness of the sentence.
Amnesty	None. There is no precedent for this in Cuban socialist state practice..	Null. It is the form that most clearly breaks with the criminal sanction.	It is usually avoided because it implies a complete break with punishment and offers no room for maintaining subsequent control.

6. The political factor in the releases

In this context, an additional dimension clearly emerges: conditional release based on the individual's political behavior. Various testimonies gathered during the 2025 trial indicate that some individuals were pressured to accept specific conditions as a requirement for their release, including renouncing activism or accepting more restrictive penal regimes under threat of return to prison. In other cases, individuals initially released on parole were subsequently forced to accept a change to conditional release, demonstrating that the legal status can be unilaterally modified by the authorities. This type of practice introduces an element of post-penitentiary control that transcends the traditional logic of criminal law, as freedom becomes subordinate to future conduct and the state's perception of the individual.

Another aspect that reinforces the non-legal nature of many releases is the opacity surrounding their implementation. In recent cases, official lists of beneficiaries have not been published, families have been notified with little advance notice, and the selection criteria have not been explained. This lack of transparency not only hinders external oversight but also renders release essentially discretionary. From an analytical perspective, this implies that the penal system operates not only under predictable normative rules but also through administrative decisions that can be adapted to specific contexts without accountability.

These processes, in turn, demonstrate how prisoner release serves a function of international legitimization. Cuban authorities have presented these measures as part of a “humanitarian trajectory” of the penal system, emphasizing its sovereign character and its connection to values such as compassion and goodwill. However, this narrative contrasts with criticisms from international organizations that point to the use of incarcerated individuals as instruments of political negotiation. In this sense, prisoner release operates simultaneously on two levels: as a mechanism for the internal management of penal control and as a tool for projecting legitimacy externally.²⁸The path of the thaw. El País analyzes the normalization process between Cuba and the United States that began in 2014, including the release of prisoners, the reopening of embassies, and economic reforms. It presents the international political context in which decisions such as prisoner releases are situated.

Finally, the role of religious actors, particularly the Catholic Church and the Vatican, introduces an additional dimension that has been a constant in Cuba's recent history. In April 2023, Church representatives confirmed their willingness to continue dialogue with the government regarding the release of prisoners, emphasizing the commitment of both sides to keep these channels open. This type of mediation is not new, as the Church has intervened in previous processes, such as the releases following the Black Spring of 2003. The recurrence of this pattern indicates that prisoner releases do not occur solely within the judicial system, but also in negotiation spaces where actors with moral or diplomatic legitimacy participate.²⁹Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cuba. (2023, January 21). Cardinal Beniamino Stella, envoy of Pope Francis, will visit Cuba. Martí News. (2023, April 27). Catholic Church: The door is open to dialogue with the Cuban government regarding the release of prisoners. 14ymedio. (2015, September 11). The Council of State grants 3,522 pardons ahead of Pope Francis' arrival. Infobae. (2015, April 22). What were the visits of John Paul II and Benedict XVI to Cuba like?.

Taken together, these examples reinforce and strengthen the initial conclusion: in Cuba, release from prison is not a uniform or purely legal act, but rather a multifunctional mechanism that allows the State to manage punishment, social control, and international pressure flexibly. The freedom resulting from these processes is, in many cases, partial, conditional, and reversible, which necessitates rethinking the very concept of release not as the endpoint of the criminal process, but as a stage within a broader system of control.

7. Cubalex's position on prison releases

Cubalex maintains that many of the so-called “releases” announced by the Cuban state do not constitute true releases in the full legal sense, but rather forms of early, conditional, and reversible release. The problem is not merely terminological. The state's use of the verb “release” often masks the application of measures such as parole or other prison benefits that do not extinguish the sentence, maintain the punitive bond, and leave the individual under the constant threat of re-incarceration. Presented as acts of openness or clemency, these measures do not break with the penal system, but rather extend its capacity for control beyond the prison walls.³⁰Cubalex. (2025, April 30). Parole without guarantees, arbitrary revocation, and enforced disappearances: The case of Félix Navarro and José Daniel Ferrer demands urgent international action.

Added to this is a structural feature of the phenomenon: opacity. Cubalex has repeatedly documented that the State does not publish complete lists of released prisoners, does not make the selection criteria transparent, and does not clearly report the specific legal status of those released from prison. This lack of information cannot be understood as a mere administrative deficiency. Rather, it operates as a functional condition of the control mechanism: it expands state discretion, hinders public scrutiny, and blocks any real possibility of accountability. Under these conditions, release ceases to be a procedure governed by verifiable parameters and becomes a selective, politically administered decision.³¹Cubalex. (2025, January 15). Cubalex denounces lack of transparency and guarantees in the release of sanctioned individuals in Cuba.

This pattern is also part of a broader logic of the political instrumentalization of incarcerated individuals. Releases from prison have been used at various times as a resource for diplomatic negotiation, a mechanism for easing internal tensions, and a tool for international legitimization. Within this framework, release from prison does not function as a guarantee of rights, but rather as a form of strategic administration of punishment. State control does not disappear: it changes form, shifts, and, in many cases, becomes less visible.

Parole clearly illustrates this logic. Far from operating as a genuine path to reintegration, it can become a mechanism for surveillance, the imposition of conditions, and political punishment. The cases of José Daniel Ferrer and Félix Navarro show how such a measure can be granted without sufficient guarantees, without genuine consent, and then arbitrarily revoked to justify re-incarceration.³²Cubalex. (2025, April 29). Cubalex denounces the arbitrary revocation of the parole of political prisoners José Daniel Ferrer and Félix Navarro. In these cases, the revocation is not based on objective violations or a strict legal framework, but rather on political criteria. The law then ceases to function as a limit on punitive power and becomes an instrument of repression. Therefore, in the Cuban context, certain forms of release are not only reversible: they can be structured from the outset as precarious mechanisms of legal control over individuals considered politically inconvenient.³³Cubalex. (2025, May 1). Cuba without legal guarantees: Revocation of parole as a form of political repression.

Cubalex has also documented the imposition of commitment agreements and other conditions that restrict fundamental rights, including freedom of expression and freedom of association. These demands not only reduce the scope of action of released prisoners but also create an environment of self-censorship, surveillance, and social discipline. Seen in this light, release does not mark the end of repression. Rather, it marks its displacement from the prison setting into everyday life, where the exercise of rights is subject to threat, supervision, and potential punishment.³⁴Cubalex. (2025, April 30). Parole without guarantees, arbitrary revocation, and enforced disappearances: The case of Félix Navarro and José Daniel Ferrer demands urgent international action.

Therefore, Cubalex affirms that the release of people imprisoned for political reasons must be immediate and unconditional. We reject the notion that these releases should be presented as humanitarian gestures or gracious concessions from the State, because when deprivation of liberty is arbitrary, its termination is not an act of benevolence, but rather the fulfillment of a legal obligation derived from the duty to respect human rights. Any release that does not entail full freedom, guarantees of non-repetition, and adequate reparations is insufficient and, in many cases, deceptive.³⁵Cubalex. (2023, February 20). Statement by human rights organizations on the situation of Cuban political prisoners.

8. Conclusions

1. Release from prison in Cuba is not a homogeneous legal category: under this term coexist mechanisms with radically different effects on liberty: some completely extinguish criminal liability, others only modify the form of serving the sentence, and still others respond to decisions of a political or administrative nature. This implies that any serious analysis must go beyond the generic notion of “release” and focus on the legal and material conditions under which it occurs. Release from prison, in itself, is an insufficient category if it is not broken down into its different modalities.
   
2. It is confirmed that forms of full freedom—such as amnesty—are marginal in Cuban practice. In contrast, those that do not extinguish the sanction, such as parole, early release, or pardon, predominate. This reveals a structural pattern: the penal system is not oriented toward resolving the legal conflict, but rather toward transforming and prolonging it. Release from prison does not represent the end of the punitive relationship, but rather its reconfiguration outside the prison walls.
   
3. The freedom resulting from these releases is, in most cases, conditional, reversible, and monitored. The possibility of revocation, the imposition of obligations and restrictions, and the persistence of state control transform release into a situation of legal precarity. This necessitates a distinction between formal freedom—leaving prison—and substantive freedom—exercising rights without interference—the latter being the one most frequently restricted.
   
4. The analysis reveals a selective use of early releases. Formal criteria (conduct, time served, age, health) coexist with implicit political filters that determine who receives these benefits and who is excluded. The evidence shows that individuals involved in exercising fundamental rights or considered opposition figures are often treated differently, confirming that early release does not operate under a principle of equality before the law.
   
5. The instrumental nature of prisoner release: throughout the period analyzed, these measures have been used as foreign policy tools, crisis management mechanisms, and resources for international legitimacy. Pardons associated with papal visits, prisoner exchanges in bilateral negotiations, and releases announced in contexts of international pressure demonstrate that the freedom of incarcerated individuals can become a political asset of the State.
   
6. Structural opacity in these processes: The lack of public information regarding beneficiaries, selection criteria, and the legal conditions of release limits the possibility of social and legal oversight. This opacity is not accidental, but functional: it allows for discretion and selectivity and prevents accountability.
   
7. Another relevant element is the coexistence of prisoner release and the expansion of penal control. Data show that mass release processes can occur simultaneously with increases in the number of sanctions or trials in other sectors. This indicates that prisoner release does not reduce the size of the penal system, but rather redistributes control, adapting it to new political or social priorities.
   
8. Furthermore, the analysis confirms that many releases can be understood as “apparent” or “simulated,” in the sense that they do not stem from an exceptional decision by the State, but rather from compliance with legal requirements that already granted the individual the right to a prison benefit. In these cases, the State presents what is actually a legal obligation as an act of clemency, reinforcing a narrative of legitimacy that does not correspond to actual practice.
   
9. Finally, a common thread runs through the entire analysis: in Cuba, release from prison is not primarily a mechanism for guaranteeing rights or ending a sentence, but rather a flexible instrument for managing penal and political control. The freedom it produces is not an absolute state, but a graduated, conditional, and, in many cases, reversible condition. 

Therefore, the real analysis should not focus on whether a person has been released from prison, but on what kind of freedom they have obtained, under what conditions, and with what real possibilities of exercising their rights.

Grades

¹ Cubalex. (2026, February 4). Political prisoners in Cuba: the legal differences between amnesty and pardon; and National Assembly of People's Power. (2019). Constitution of the Republic of Cuba. Official Gazette No. 5 Extraordinary of April 10, 2019

²  The conditional remission of deprivation of liberty It is a benefit that allows the court to leave unexecuted a prison sentence of up to five years when it is considered that the person can be socially reintegrated without going to prison. It does not mean absolution or immediate removal of the sanction: the person remains subject to a probation The sentence is one to five years, and the offender must comply with the obligations imposed by the court. If these conditions are met, the sentence may be extinguished; if the offender commits another crime, fails to fulfill their duties, or continues to misconduct, the court may order the sentence to be carried out. This procedure is regulated in the Chapter IX, “Conditional remission of the sanction”, Article 88 of Law 151/2022, Penal Code. All articles of the Cuban Penal Code cited in this report can be consulted at the National Assembly of People's Power. (2022). Law 151/2022. Penal Code. Official Gazette No. 93 Ordinary of September 1, 2022.

³ The statute of limitations for criminal prosecution This means that if the time stipulated by law elapses without the State validly exercising criminal prosecution or without it progressing in the terms foreseen, the possibility of judging the crime is extinguished. The statute of limitations for the sanction, On the other hand, it means that, once a final sentence has been imposed, the State loses the possibility of executing it if the time period established by law passes without taking action. In both cases, the calculation can be interrupted by certain legally prescribed actions and restart from zero. These procedures are regulated in the Title VII, “Extinction of criminal liability”, articles 96 and 97 of the Law 151/2022, Penal Code, and constitute causes of extinction of criminal liability also recognized in the Article 90 of the Code itself.

He complainant is the offended or harmed person who presents and maintains a complaint before the court to initiate criminal proceedings in those crimes whose prosecution depends on private initiative. In other words, it is not the person who merely reports an incident, but the one who formally acts as the prosecuting party in the proceedings. Law 143/2021, on Criminal Procedure, It stipulates that in crimes prosecutable at the request of a private party, criminal action is exercised exclusively through a complaint, and also recognizes that the complainant may withdraw from that action before a judgment is issued. See Articles 437, 700, 701 and 704 of the Law of Criminal Procedure. The opportunity criteria These are cases in which the Criminal Procedure Law authorizes the prosecutor to to forgo presenting the case to the court and to refrain from exercising criminal action, even when a punishable act has occurred, provided the legal requirements are met. They generally apply to crimes committed through negligence or intentional crimes punishable by up to five years' imprisonment, and produce extinctive effect of public criminal action, so the case cannot be brought before the court later. For this to happen, the law requires, among other things, the defendant's consent, hearing the victim or injured party, and that the damage has been repaired, agreed upon, or waived. conditional dismissal, For its part, it is a form of conditional termination of the process that the prosecutor requests from the court when he considers that the end of the punishment can be achieved without initiating criminal proceedings, but subjecting the accused to a probation from one to two years and compliance with certain restrictions or measures. If that period is satisfactorily completed, the court orders the case to be dismissed. extinction of criminal liability; If this condition is not met, the dismissal may be revoked and the criminal proceedings resumed. These consequences are provided for in the Articles 17, 18, 19, 419, 420, 421 and 422 of the Law 143/2021, on Criminal Procedure, in relation to the Article 95 of the Law 151/2022, Penal Code.

⁴ He royal competition This occurs when the same person commits several different crimes, through separate shares, and each person is punished separately. Then, the court combines those sentences into one joint sanction in accordance with the rules established by law. In simple terms: it is not a single event with multiple consequences, but rather several separate crimes committed by the same person. Therefore, if an amnesty does not include all the crimes that make up that concurrence, the person is not completely amnestied and must continue to serve the corresponding sentence for the crime that was left out.

⁵ Senate of the Republic of Cuba. (1919). Pardon Law of August 15, 1919. Florida International University College of Law eCollections.

⁶ Council of State. (2011). Decree No. 1/2011. Official Gazette No. 47 Extraordinary of December 24, 2011; and Council of State. (2015). Decree No. 1/2015. Official Gazette No. 31 Extraordinary of September 11, 2015.

⁷ The expression “in a non-exhaustive manner” This means that the list of crimes mentioned in that article It is neither closed nor exhaustive. In other words, the law lists some scenarios as examples, but This does not preclude the possibility that the same regime could be applied to other crimes. Yes, because of its characteristics or its high social harm, the court considers it justified to impose that stricter requirement to assess parole.

⁸ All articles of the Criminal Enforcement Law cited in this report can be consulted at the National Assembly of People's Power. (2022). Law 152/2022. Criminal Enforcement Law. Official Gazette No. 94 Ordinary of September 1, 2022.

⁹ The expression “it is paid at the end of the sanction” means that The time during which the person remains on extra-penal leave counts as part of the fulfillment of the sentence. In other words, that period is neither lost nor added later, but rather is deducted from the total time of the imposed sanction, even if the person is not physically in prison during that time.

¹⁰ Consult: Cubalex. (2025, March 8). Early release in Cuba: Lack of transparency and political use of the judicial system. Cubalex. (2025, April 30). Parole without guarantees, arbitrary revocation, and enforced disappearances: The case of Félix Navarro and José Daniel Ferrer demands urgent international action. Cubalex. (2025, January 15). Cubalex denounces lack of transparency and guarantees in the release of sanctioned individuals in Cuba. Cubalex. (2025, May 1). Cuba without legal guarantees: Revocation of parole as a form of political repression.

¹¹ The formal freedom It refers to the cessation of physical confinement: the person leaves the penitentiary, but may remain legally subject to the sentence, conditions of compliance, state supervision, and the possibility of revocation. material freedom, In contrast, it refers to the effective enjoyment of liberty, understood as the real possibility of exercising rights and carrying out daily life without an intense surveillance regime, without disproportionate restrictions, and without the constant threat of re-imprisonment. In this sense, a person may regain formal freedom upon leaving prison and yet not achieve full material freedom if they remain subject to control mechanisms that substantially limit their autonomy and the exercise of their rights. 

¹² 14ymedio. (2015, September 11). The Council of State grants 3,522 pardons ahead of Pope Francis' arrival. Infobae. (2015, April 22). What were the visits of John Paul II and Benedict XVI to Cuba like?. 

¹³ Cubadebate. (2011, December 28). Cuba publishes names of those pardoned (+ Gazette).

¹⁴ Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. (1979). Report on the situation of political prisoners in Cuba: Chapter IV. Recent developments concerning political prisoners. Organization of American States. 

¹⁵ 14ymedio. (2019, July 19). The Government pardons more than 2,600 prisoners.

¹⁶ EFE. (April 3, 2026). The Cuban government announces the pardon of 2,010 prisoners. SWI swissinfo.ch. Granma. (2026, April 2). Cuban government announces decision to pardon more than 2,000 sanctioned individuals. September 5th.

¹⁷ RTVE.es & EFE. (2011, February 20). Cuba releases another prisoner of conscience from the Group of 75 who rejects exile in Spain. Cubaencuentro. (2011, February 19). Church announces release of another prisoner from the 75. 

¹⁸ Ladies in White. (2011, March 23). Cuba announces the release of the last two political prisoners from the Group of 75.

¹⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cuba. (2023, January 21). Cardinal Beniamino Stella, envoy of Pope Francis, will visit Cuba. Martí News. (2023, April 27). Catholic Church: The door is open to dialogue with the Cuban government regarding the release of prisoners.

²⁰ Associated Press. (2015, January 12). Cuba releases 53 prisoners as part of historic deal with US. PBS NewsHour.

²¹ Domínguez, JI (2025, January 19). Obama in 2014 and Biden in 2025: similarities and differences in making changes to policy towards Cuba. Temas Magazine. Amnesty International. (2025, February 17). Cuba: One month after announcements of releases, hundreds of people remain in prison. Cubalex. (2026, March 16). Cubalex Statement on the Announced Release of 51 Persons Deprived of Liberty in Cuba.

²² Castro, Y. (2020, June 7). Justice, in the middle ground (+Video). Granma. Daily News of Cuba. (2020, June 17). More than 10,000 Cuban prisoners were released during the pandemic, according to the regime..

²³ Diario de Cuba. (2020, June 8). More than a thousand people imprisoned for the trials held in Cuba during the pandemic. Radio Havana Cuba. (2020, April 16). Courts in Cuba act rigorously against indiscipline in the face of COVID-19. Escambray.

²⁴ SWI swissinfo.ch. (2026, March 13). The Cuban government announces the release of 51 prisoners following an agreement with the Vatican..

²⁵ Although the official statement published by Granma indicated that those sanctioned by “robbery with violence or force using weapons or with minor victims”, The first journalistic coverage of the releases documented the liberation of people convicted of heist; For example, The Country It was reported that among the first released prisoners were inmates convicted of common crimes “such as robbery or bribery.” This suggests, at the very least, a lack of public clarity regarding the actual scope of the announced exclusions and reinforces criticism of the opacity with which these processes are implemented.

²⁶ Granma. (2026, April 2). Cuban government announces decision to pardon more than 2,000 sanctioned individuals.

²⁷ Amnesty International. (2025, February 17). Cuba: One month after announcements of releases, hundreds of people remain in prison.

²⁸ The path of the thaw. El País analyzes the normalization process between Cuba and the United States that began in 2014, including the release of prisoners, the reopening of embassies, and economic reforms. It presents the international political context in which decisions such as prisoner releases are situated.

²⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cuba. (2023, January 21). Cardinal Beniamino Stella, envoy of Pope Francis, will visit Cuba. Martí News. (2023, April 27). Catholic Church: The door is open to dialogue with the Cuban government regarding the release of prisoners. 14ymedio. (2015, September 11). The Council of State grants 3,522 pardons ahead of Pope Francis' arrival. Infobae. (2015, April 22). What were the visits of John Paul II and Benedict XVI to Cuba like?. 

³⁰ Cubalex. (2025, April 30). Parole without guarantees, arbitrary revocation, and enforced disappearances: The case of Félix Navarro and José Daniel Ferrer demands urgent international action. 

³¹ Cubalex. (2025, January 15). Cubalex denounces lack of transparency and guarantees in the release of sanctioned individuals in Cuba.

³² Cubalex. (2025, April 29). Cubalex denounces the arbitrary revocation of the parole of political prisoners José Daniel Ferrer and Félix Navarro. 

³³ Cubalex. (2025, May 1). Cuba without legal guarantees: Revocation of parole as a form of political repression.

³⁴ Cubalex. (2025, April 30). Parole without guarantees, arbitrary revocation, and enforced disappearances: The case of Félix Navarro and José Daniel Ferrer demands urgent international action.

³⁵ Cubalex. (2023, February 20). Statement by human rights organizations on the situation of Cuban political prisoners.