This legal analysis, prepared by the Cubalex legal team, examines the serious procedural and substantive irregularities in the case of Ricardo Suárez Marrero, a former MININT officer convicted of politically motivated crimes. The report demonstrates how criminal law and military jurisdiction have been used to punish critical expression and ideologically discipline those who challenge power, even from within the system.
In a Cuban city, a 59-year-old retiree publishes critical texts on social media under a pseudonym. He denounces malpractice within the Ministry of the Interior, speaking of corruption, questionable decisions, and worn-out power structures. What Ricardo Suárez Marrero perhaps didn't imagine was that these publications, made as a retired civilian, would be considered acts of espionage by the very people who were once his comrades in uniform.
Ricardo is not a traditional dissident. For years he was part of the Ministry of the Interior's structure, dedicated to what in Cuba is known as the "fight against subversion." That is, he was in charge of monitoring, persecuting, and, on occasion, suppress The work of activists, journalists, and human rights defenders. That's why, for many people, it's difficult to empathize with their current situation.
But beyond his past, what is at stake today is a fundamental question: Can a person be judged fairly in Cuba when he dares to speak out, even after having served in power?
Ricardo was convicted of six crimes: espionage, disclosure of secrets, and four counts of contempt. The story behind these accusations leaves a bitter taste.
The documents and the doubts
Ricardo was sanctioned for possessing old documents from the Ministry of the Interior (MININT), some of which he used as reference material for his critical writings. These included, for example, a manual on operational psychology and some handwritten notes. According to the authorities, this material was supposed to remain "classified." But no technical evidence was ever presented to demonstrate that these documents remained confidential. No expert reports, no updated certifications. It was simply assumed that they were secret because an internal Ministry order stated so. It's as if someone kept an old manual from their previous job at home and, for using it years later to criticize their former employer, were accused of treason.
But there's more. He's not only being punished for keeping those documents, but also for writing about corruption and abuses on social media. For the court, that was enough to consider him a spy. No evidence was presented that he shared information with foreign governments, nor that he personally benefited from what he published. Even so, the court's interpretation was unequivocal: criticizing the system—even as a retired civilian—can be considered a threat to national security.
Spy on whom? And how?
When you think of a spy, you imagine someone who steals secrets, uses false identities, and infiltrates forbidden places. But Ricardo did none of that. He didn't use special devices, he didn't hide to obtain information, and the data he handled was already in his possession due to his previous position. The only "infiltration" was posting on social media under a pseudonym.
The court interpreted that publication, regardless of its actual impact, as an act of espionage. Cuban law requires that for this crime there be a clear intent to harm national defense or assist a foreign actor. In this case, that intent was never proven. It was merely assumed.
Criticism is not a crime
Another part of the conviction was based on his criticism of state officials. The court found him guilty of “contempt,” a legal charge that penalizes insults against authorities. But these were not personal insults or vulgar offenses. They were politically motivated criticisms, signed with a pseudonym, in which he questioned the functioning of the government and its institutions.
According to international human rights treaties, these expressions are protected by freedom of thought and expression. Even the Cuban Constitution itself recognizes the right of citizens to freely express their opinions. Sanctioning a person for criticizing those in power—especially when they are no longer part of the armed forces—is incompatible with these fundamental principles. Criticism cannot be equated with a crime.
A civilian tried as a military officer
Perhaps one of the most troubling aspects of the case is that, although Ricardo was already retired and his actions were unrelated to his military duties, he was tried in military courts. This is not merely a matter of procedure. Military justice is designed for cases that occur within the military sphere: active-duty soldiers, internal conflicts, disciplinary infractions. But judging a civilian for his public opinions in a court where the judges are also military personnel calls into question the impartiality of the trial.
International law—and the Cuban Constitution itself—requires that individuals be tried by an independent and impartial tribunal. When this rule is violated, the right to a fair trial is jeopardized. And that, regardless of Ricardo's past, should concern us all.
An uncomfortable case, but one that needs to be told
It's understandable that many people don't sympathize with Ricardo Suárez Marrero. His involvement in the repression of activists left deep scars. But in a state governed by the rule of law, rights are not lost because of a person's past. Even someone who was part of the system has the right to express their ideas, to be tried with due process, and not to be punished disproportionately.
Ricardo's story highlights a larger problem: how criminal law is used in Cuba to silence those who are inconvenient for the regime, even if they once served it. Justice cannot be a tool of revenge or an instrument of political control. Telling his story is not about justifying what happened, but about pointing out what is wrong. Because today a retiree is imprisoned for writing criticisms of the government, but tomorrow it could be any one of us.
Legal Analysis: The Criminal Construction of the “Internal Enemy” in the Case of Ricardo Suárez Marrero
The case of Ricardo Suárez Marrero, a former official of the Ministry of the Interior (MININT), convicted in 2024 of espionage, disclosure of secrets concerning state security, and contempt of court, clearly illustrates the tensions between the Cuban penal system, constitutional principles, and international human rights standards. This analysis reveals how the expansive use of criminal law and military jurisdiction shaped a process tainted by numerous substantive and procedural irregularities that compromise its legal validity.
I. The criminal offense of espionage: between conceptual expansion and the absence of intent
The conviction for espionage is based on Article 116.3 of the Cuban Penal Code. However, an analysis of the sentence reveals an expansive interpretation incompatible with the principles of legality and specificity in criminal law. According to criminal doctrine, espionage requires at least three elements: (i) clandestine or fraudulent access to classified information, (ii) lack of legitimate authorization, and (iii) specific intent or intent to affect the security of the State, generally through communication with hostile actors.
In the case of Suárez Marrero, the documents used were obtained in the legitimate exercise of his functions and kept after his discharge in 2018. There is no evidence of hidden conduct, the use of covert means or infiltration, essential elements to constitute the criminal offense.
Furthermore, it was not demonstrated that the documents retained strategic value or classification validity at the time of their disclosure. The absence of technical expert reports or updated certifications invalidates the alleged confidentiality. The presumption of “secrecy” based on internal MININT regulations (Orders 4/2018, 23/2007, and 21/2004) does not meet the criminal standard required by Decree-Laws 78/2024 and 199/1999, which mandate the inclusion of such documents in formal institutional records.
Finally, the specific intent was constructed ex post facto, This stems from the political consequences of the publications, which contravenes the principle of culpability and responsibility for the act. The conduct—framed within the freedom of critical expression—has no connection to foreign powers or hostile intelligence purposes.
II. Disclosure of secrets: double criminality and presumption of harm
The simultaneous charge of revealing secrets (Article 117.1.2.a of the Criminal Code) overlaps with the crime of espionage in the same acts: the preservation and dissemination of documents obtained in the course of official duties. This accumulation violates the principle of criminal specialty and constitutes a breach of the principle double jeopardy, by sanctioning the same material conduct twice.
Even more serious, the classification of the act as the criminal offense of revealing secrets is based solely on internal administrative regulations, disregarding the requirement for technical and legal justification of the information's classification. Instead of proving the potential or actual harm resulting from the disclosure, the risk is presumed simply because the documents originated from the institution.
The content of the publications themselves—which includes critical analyses of MININT structures, references to obsolete operations, and labor grievances—was not materially assessed to determine whether it could cause concrete harm to national security. The accusation is based on an abstract notion of danger, which violates the principle of harm.
III. Contempt: clash between criminal law and freedom of expression
The charge of contempt, pursuant to Article 185.1.2 of the Penal Code, was applied to critical statements made by Suárez Marrero regarding high-ranking state officials. However, the ruling fails to analyze the subjective element of intent and the harmful intensity of the expressive content.
Contempt, as a criminal offense, has been widely questioned by international bodies. Both the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the UN Human Rights Committee have maintained that such laws, by punishing critical opinions directed at public authorities, constitute an inadmissible form of criminal censorship. General Comment No. 34 of the Human Rights Committee states that contempt laws are “incompatible per se” with Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
Cuba, a signatory to the ICCPR since 2008, has assumed the international obligation to refrain from acts contrary to the object of the treaty, pursuant to Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Additionally, Article 54 of the Constitution recognizes the right to freedom of expression, which cannot be restricted by criminal offenses incompatible with the existing constitutional framework.
IV. Military jurisdiction over a civilian: violation of the right to a natural judge
One of the most questionable aspects of the process is the intervention of the military courts to try a retired civilian for events that occurred years after he left his position at the Ministry of the Interior (MININT). Neither the initial ruling (Eastern Territorial Military Court) nor the appeal ruling (Military Chamber of the Supreme People's Court) justifies the military court's jurisdiction, either materially or personally.
This omission violates the right to a natural judge, enshrined in Article 14.1 of the ICCPR and Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Both instruments form part of the Cuban legal system pursuant to Article 8 of the Constitution, which establishes the direct incorporation of international treaties signed by Cuba into the national constitutional framework.
International jurisprudence has consistently rejected the jurisdiction of military courts over civilians, except in exceptional circumstances that do not apply in this case. Applying a special jurisdiction without legal basis violates due process and constitutes an absolute procedural nullity.
V. Conclusion: criminal law as an instrument of ideological discipline
The conviction of Ricardo Suárez Marrero highlights a pattern of the expansive use of criminal law to punish dissent, even when it comes from former members of the state apparatus. Far from protecting specific legal interests, the criminal offenses used in this case operate as symbolic mechanisms to sanction the loss of institutional loyalty.
From the perspective of the rule of law, the broad application of the law, the absence of intent, the lack of harm, the double jeopardy, and the disregard for the natural judge constitute a process contrary to the basic principles of due process in criminal law. Therefore, a comprehensive review of the process is urgently needed to restore the violated guarantees and re-establish the coherence of the Cuban legal system with the international commitments that the State itself has undertaken.