For more than three decades, prison authorities and the Ministry of the Interior (MININT) in Cuba have conditioned prison benefits —such as regime changes, parole, or extra-penal licenses— on the illegal surrender of firearms by inmates and their families. This practice It turns recognized rights into illicit currency, exposes families to legal and financial risks, releases dangerous criminals, and directly links the State to the black market for weapons.
This is a pattern documented by Cubalex over years of research, and has also been corroborated by independent sources, including public complaints in the media and military court proceedings related to the theft and illegal sale of weapons by officials, which demonstrate the existence of a black market in which both civilians and military personnel participate.
This phenomenon unfolds within a prison system characterized by extreme overcrowding, precarious infrastructure, and a lack of independent oversight. Cuba maintains one of the world's highest incarceration rates, with over 90,000 people deprived of their liberty in facilities far exceeding their actual capacity. This is compounded by critical structural conditions, such as prisons with collapsed roofs, unsanitary facilities, lack of potable water, and inadequate ventilation systems, documented even in high-security prisons like Kilo 8 and Combinado del Este.
In this context, where the material conditions of prisons constitute human rights violations in themselves and the State has systematically denied the existence of structural problems, it is consistent that illicit practices such as the exchange of weapons for prison benefits flourish. These practices are made possible by institutional opacity, absolute discretion in the application of the Criminal Enforcement Law, and the lack of effective judicial oversight.
Context
The practice denounced by Cubalex takes place within a prison system characterized by opacity, discretion, and lack of independent oversight. Since 1959, the Cuban state has maintained a absolute monopoly on firearms, This has been reinforced by regulations such as Decree-Law 262/2008, which severely restricts civilian possession and concentrates broad powers in the Ministry of the Interior (MININT). This state control, far from eliminating the illegal circulation of weapons, has coexisted with illicit networks linked to state officials.
The Cuban prison system presents persistent structural problemsExtreme overcrowding, deteriorating infrastructure, unsanitary conditions, and a lack of effective judicial oversight mechanisms are among the deficiencies. International bodies, particularly the Committee against Torture, have repeatedly pointed out these shortcomings, while the State has denied or minimized their existence and has refused independent inspections.
How the exchange works in practice
Since the late eighties and early nineties, prison authorities and agents of the Technical Investigations Department (DTI) have systematically demanded the surrender of firearms as a condition for granting prison benefits, a practice known informally among inmates as “The Agreement”.
The process usually begins with interviews between the inmate—or their family—and prison officials, in which the possibility of improve the sentence enforcement regime (transfer to minimum security camps, reduced sentence, parole, or non-penal licenses) in exchange for obtaining a weapon. arbitrary denial of legally recognized benefits It is used as pressure to force acceptance of the deal.
Eliober Sosa Villavicencio, a former prison re-educator interviewed by Cubalex, explained that it began in the 1990s and, over time, ceased to be an exceptional procedure and became a mechanism known to inmates.
Although the participants are mostly people convicted of common crimes, There are no real limits per type of crime.: benefits have been documented granted to those convicted of homicide, rape, robbery with violence or drug trafficking, while they are systematically denied to political prisoners or inmates with serious health problems, even when they meet the legal requirements.
Families, generally in a situation of high economic vulnerability, They are forced to turn to the black market, sell essential goods, or go into debt to obtain weapons. Prices have increased significantly: while in the 1980s and 1990s a gun might cost $8, between 2015 and 2020 they ranged from $300 to $800. Currently, after the monetary reform, they fluctuate between 130,000 and 180,000 CUP, equivalent to more than 20 average salaries. The most requested weapons are those issued to the Ministry of the Interior and the Armed Forces, although others are accepted, provided they are not homemade.
In some cases, the weapons are checked by forensic laboratories before the benefit is granted, to verify that they are not linked to violent acts.
Particularly serious are situations in which the family members end up being criminally prosecuted for weapons-related offenses, despite having acted at the instigation of state officials themselves. This practice thus transforms prison rights in illicit goods, institutionalizing corruption within the criminal justice system.
Consequences and risks
For incarcerated individuals and their families, this means coercion, severe indebtedness and exposure to criminal risks, ...as they are forced to participate in the illicit arms market. This creates a structural economic discrimination, Since only those with resources or connections can access benefits, while the poorest remain incarcerated. Furthermore, released prisoners are left under constant threat of blackmail, which reinforces fear and self-censorship.
For victims of serious crimes, the illegal release of perpetrators constitutes a revictimization, By conveying the message that justice is negotiable and that the seriousness of a crime can be negated through corruption, it weakens public trust in the judicial system and normalizes impunity.
For society in general, bartering fuels the informal arms market, This increases the risks of violence and contradicts the official discourse of control and security. The early release of people convicted of violent crimes directly compromises public safety and worsens the discrediting of institutions.
Internationally, the practice reveals a systematic non-compliance with international obligations of the Cuban state and links it to illicit arms trafficking, with potential impacts on regional security. Taken together, the arms exchange not only violates individual rights, but also It completely corrupts the penal system and consolidates a model in which freedom is administered as an instrument of control and negotiation.
Recommendations
Cubalex formulates recommendations aimed at different actors:
To the Cuban State, demands the immediate cessation of the practice and the sanction of those responsible; the reform of the Criminal Enforcement Law to guarantee objective and transparent criteria; the independent supervision of prison facilities; the adoption of measures of comprehensive repair for the victims; and the publication of verifiable prison statistics.
To international human rights mechanisms, It requests an investigation into the practice as a form of coercion and degrading treatment; an examination of the lack of judicial independence; and addressing the phenomenon as an expression of structural corruption; consider the exchange of weapons as an aggravating factor in arbitrary detention; and incorporate the issue into the observations to the Cuban State.
To the international community, It recommends conditioning diplomatic negotiations on verifiable commitments to prison transparency, supporting the work of independent civil society, and establishing early warning mechanisms against illicit prison practices with an impact on public safety.