On January 14, 2025, the Cuban government announced the release of 553 people, categorically denying that they were political prisoners and reaffirming that the crime of sedition is not political in nature. This statement demonstrates, once again, how the authorities attempt to obscure human rights violations through carefully constructed official narratives.
The crimes mentioned in the official statements include theft, robbery, threats, assault, public disorder, and, especially, sedition. The government insists that these sanctions are not politically motivated, in an attempt to deny the existence of political prisoners and discredit international condemnations.
The aforementioned criminal offenses, with the sole exception of sedition, are not strictly political in nature. By their legal definition, they can be committed by anyone, regardless of their political stance. However, the Cuban government has selectively used them to punish political opponents and human rights activists, as part of repressive patterns documented by Cubalex and other organizations, both within Cuban civil society and internationally.
For example, Luis Manuel Otero Alcántara, artist and leader of the San Isidro Movement (MSI), was sentenced to five years in prison for insulting national symbols, contempt and public disorder; Roberto Pérez Fonseca, a participant in the protests of July 11, 2021, was convicted of contempt, assault and public disorder; José Daniel Ferrer, The leader of the Patriotic Union of Cuba (UNPACU) was sanctioned for the crimes of assault and public disorder; while Mitzael Díaz Paseiro, a political opponent, is serving a sentence for the crime of public disorder and other charges related to his political activism.
This instrumental use of the penal system demonstrates how the government judicializes dissent and criminalizes the exercise of fundamental rights such as freedom of expression and assembly.
The use of sedition in Cuba
The case of sedition deserves special attention due to its essentially political nature. After 1959, Huber Matos He received a 20-year prison sentence for sedition.. In 1999, Vladimiro Roca Antúnez, René Gómez Manzano, Martha Beatriz Roque Cabello, and Félix Bonne Carcassés were sentenced to between three and five years. years on sedition charges. Therefore, this has not been a frequent figure in the courts or in official discourse. No records of sedition charges are found in the newspaper's archives. Granma, nor in the collection of the Cuban Journal of Law. No one is accused of sedition after the "Maleconazo" (1994), nor is it mentioned in some of the speeches that Fidel Castro pronounced in August 1994. However, this reality changed drastically after the protests of July 2021, when the government began to systematically employ sedition as an instrument of political repression.
According to article 121 of Cuban Penal Code, Sedition is considered to be committed by those who, tumultuously and through express or tacit agreement, employing violence, disturb the socialist constitutional order, the holding of elections, referendums, plebiscites or popular consultations, prevent compliance with any final judgment or resolution of the courts, legal provision or measure issued by the State or Government, or by a civil or military authority in the exercise of their respective functions, refuse to obey them, make demands, or resist fulfilling their duties, and are punished as follows:
a) With deprivation of liberty for ten to thirty years, perpetual deprivation of liberty or death, if the crime is committed in exceptional situations, disaster or affects the security of the State, or during serious disturbance of public order, or in a military zone, resorting to weapons or exercising violence;
b) with imprisonment for ten to twenty years, if the crime is committed without resorting to weapons or exercising violence and any of the other circumstances expressed in the previous paragraph are present; or if weapons have been used or violence exercised, and the crime is committed outside a military zone in peacetime; and
c) with deprivation of liberty of three to eight years, in other cases.
Although the government insists on presenting sedition as a crime detached from politics, this stance ignores the true nature of the offense. In practice, sedition has become a key tool of repression used to criminalize those who exercise fundamental rights, such as peaceful protest and freedom of expression, as has been demonstrated. documented Cubalex.
The crime of sedition has been systematically used to prosecute and imprison political opponents, human rights activists, and citizens who have spoken out against the government, including women such as Dayana Camejo Ramos, Jessica Lisbet Torres Calvo, and Keyla Roxana Mulet Calderón. These types of sanctions seek to criminalize the exercise of human rights, especially freedom of expression and assembly, demobilize civil society by generating fear of political participation and protest, and impose exemplary punishments with the aim of deterring future expressions of discontent.
A clear example of this strategy was the response to the July 2021 protests, when hundreds of demonstrators were arrested and prosecuted for the crime of sedition. Among them were young people and activists, whose only “crime” was to demonstrate peacefully demanding change.
The official narrative denying the existence of political prisoners is part of a broader strategy to delegitimize international denunciations of repression in Cuba and minimize criticism of human rights violations, presenting arrests as legitimate sanctions. This stance contrasts with international human rights standards, which recognize as repressive the actions of governments that persecute and criminalize the exercise of fundamental rights.
A investigation Cubalex's report on the use of the crime of sedition in criminal proceedings against protesters on July 11, 2021, confirmed that its application was motivated by political reasons.
The protests were labelled as seditious acts with the aim of criminalizing social discontent and portraying the demonstrations as attempts to overthrow the ruling class.
The legal proceedings revealed the subordination of the courts to political power. This bias was demonstrated by the deliberate omission of key factors that motivated the protests, such as the impact of the Economic Reorganization Plan, which deepened the economic crisis, affecting the right to a dignified life, access to food and health, and, consequently, other fundamental rights, including the right to life.
The analysis of the court rulings revealed the use of stigmatizing and discriminatory language, for both political and racial reasons.
The incriminating evidence presented at the trials was based on subjective aspects, such as the defendants' physical appearance, voice, or smell. This evidence only demonstrated their presence at the protest, but did not constitute sufficient proof beyond a reasonable doubt of their participation in the violent acts with which they were charged.
The statements of witnesses in the preparatory phase came mostly from state agents, many of whom were responsible for serious human rights violations against the protesters, who were, in reality, the victims.
Furthermore, key aspects were omitted from the judicial processes, such as:
– The superior orders given to the security forces to prevent the exercise of the right to protest.
– The repressive actions of state agents during the demonstrations.
– The death of Diubis Laurencio Tejeda, who was shot by law enforcement.
– The intervention of civilians in plain clothes, who acted violently under orders from state agents.
– Serious human rights violations, such as temporary enforced disappearances and torture during detention.
The court endorsed the abusive conduct of political power, guaranteeing impunity for the repressive forces. To date, no investigation has been initiated to prosecute and punish the state agents, members of an armed institution, who used unnecessary force, violence, and firearms against protesters, as shown in the thousands of videos that circulated that month on social media and were later used to frame a small group of protesters as a warning to the rest. The contextual reasons the courts used to prosecute the protesters, in some ways, persist today. Despite censorship and state surveillance, the internet and social media continue to be legitimate spaces for protest and for making reality visible to Cuban citizens.
Furthermore, the crime of sedition has been used to criminalize people who participated in protests after 11J, such as those that occurred in the municipality of Nuevitas, Camagüey.
With the same purpose of suppressing peaceful protest, the regime sanctioned protesters in the municipality of Caimanera, Guantánamo, who in May 2023 took to the streets to denounce the lack of food, medicine and the precariousness of public services in their community.
Faced with the impossibility of punishing them for the crime of sedition, the authorities again employed common crimes such as public disorder, incitement to commit crimes, assault, and resisting arrest. This repressive pattern demonstrates that, beyond sedition, any crime stipulated in Cuban penal law can be used as a tool for political persecution. In Cuba, the free exercise of fundamental rights, especially the right to protest, continues to be punished with arbitrary sanctions in order to silence social discontent and discourage further demonstrations against the government.
Conclusions
The actions of the Cuban government violate fundamental human rights standards, including the right to due process, freedom of expression, and the right to peaceful protest, among others.
Despite the official narrative surrounding the release of 553 people, which seeks to conceal the systematic human rights violations in Cuba, the reality is that the status of political prisoners is not determined by the crime they are accused of, but by the reasons behind their punishment. In many cases, these individuals have been sanctioned simply for exercising their fundamental rights.
While denying the political nature of crimes such as sedition, the Cuban government attempts to deflect international criticism and perpetuate a false narrative about the human rights situation in the country.
Cubalex demands a genuine commitment to respecting and guaranteeing the fundamental rights of activists, political opponents, and citizens in general. It is essential to put an end to the official narratives that attempt to justify the unjustifiable and to acknowledge the reality of human rights violations in Cuba, adopting concrete measures to stop them. The Cuban government cannot continue using repression and manipulation of public discourse to obscure the political persecution and punishment of dissenters.