In the coming weeks, Cubalex's legal team will publish a series of analyses on the Draft of the new Labor Code Disseminated by the Cuban State since 2025, a regulatory proposal intended to replace the current Law 116/2013.
Although the new text incorporates references to contemporary work realities—such as teleworking, digitalization, and the expansion of SMEs—it also maintains and even reformulates state control mechanisms that continue to limit the effective exercise of fundamental rights recognized in international standards, including the conventions of the International Labour Organization (ILO), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).
This series will examine, in a comparative manner, the continuities and ruptures between the Law 116/2013 and the 2025 Draft Bill, paying particular attention to the new articles and legal concepts incorporated, the provisions eliminated or modified, and the changes in the scope of workers' and employers' rights and obligations. Likewise, the transformations in labor dispute resolution mechanisms and the variations in the legal language used will be analyzed, insofar as they may translate into expansions or restrictions of guarantees. The texts will also address the political, economic, and institutional control motivations that help explain these reforms.
Without independent unions or the right to strike
The Draft Labor Code of 2025 It maintains, without essential changes, the union model established in Cuba for decades.s: a single-union system under the structure of the Central Organization of Cuban Workers (CTC), with no legal space for independent organizations. Although the text formally recognizes freedom of association, legal analysis shows that this freedom remains severely limited in practice.
Article 473.1 of the draft bill establishes that the exercise of freedom of association must be carried out “in accordance with (…) its founding unitary principles.” This same wording already appeared in Law 116 and has historically served to prevent the creation and recognition of autonomous unions outside the CTC (Confederation of Cuban Workers). Thus, the new text preserves a centralized and exclusionary model that, according to international standards, contradicts the right of workers to create the organizations they deem appropriate without prior authorization.
This design is neither accidental nor recent. It forms part of a progressive consolidation of a single trade union system that dates back to 1976 and has strengthened state control over labor representation. This is incompatible with Convention 87 of the International Labour Organization (ILO) and Article 8 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), both of which are aimed at protecting genuine and effective freedom of association.
Although the Preliminary Draft introduces For the first time, a clause against anti-union discrimination has been included, but its scope is limited. Article 473.3 prohibits conditioning employment or dismissal on union membership, but this protection only benefits officially recognized unions. In practice, those who attempt to create independent unions or operate outside the CTC would remain unprotected against workplace reprisals.
The problem is compounded because both the draft bill and current legislation omit political opinion from the categories protected against discrimination. This exclusion is especially relevant in the Cuban context, where for years dismissals, loss of "suitability," denial of promotions, and employment restrictions based on political or ideological criteria have been documented. This omission contradicts international standards of equality and non-discrimination, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and ILO Convention 111.
The collective bargaining also remains heavily controlled by the State. Although Articles 490 to 502 formally recognize this right, Article 492.1 mandates that collective bargaining agreements conform to "General Guidelines" defined by state agencies and the CTC itself. This means that labor agreements cannot be freely negotiated in each company, but must adhere to guidelines previously established from above.
This model turns collective bargaining into an essentially formal mechanism, intended more to implement state policies than to defend the interests of workers. ILO Conventions 98 and 154 They establish that collective bargaining must be free, voluntary and without state interference, conditions that the Draft Bill does not guarantee.
One of the most critical elements is the aTotal absence of the right to strike. Neither the Draft Bill nor Law 116 recognizes this right., Internationally considered a fundamental tool for legitimate worker pressure, the investigation indicates that the de facto prohibition of strikes has been in place in Cuba since 1961 and that the new text does not correct this omission.
The lack of recognition of the right to strike has direct consequences for the balance of labor relations. Without this tool, workers lack effective mechanisms to pressure for improved working conditions or defend their interests against employers and the state. Furthermore, it further weakens collective bargaining and union autonomy.
The system for resolving collective labor disputes also remains under state control. Articles 499 to 502 maintain a system administered by the National Labor Inspection Office, composed of state inspectors, representatives of the CTC (Central Organization of Cuban Workers), and officials from state or business organizations. According to the analysis, this prevents the existence of a truly independent and impartial body for resolving collective labor disputes.
The Preliminary Draft also It expands the political and ideological role assigned to trade unions. Various articles assign them functions related to political education, labor discipline, socialist emulation, and participation in business planning. Instead of acting as independent organizations that exclusively represent the interests of workers, trade unions continue to function as structures linked to the state and political apparatus.
Overall, the The draft of the 2025 Labor Code does not represent a substantial advance in terms of freedom of association. On the contrary, it maintains the CTC's union monopoly, does not protect those who try to organize independent unions, preserves collective bargaining subordinate to the State, excludes the right to strike, and reinforces the political role of official unions.
Furthermore, the legislation still fails to recognize discrimination based on political opinion and does not establish impartial mechanisms for resolving collective disputes. In its current form, the draft legislation remains incompatible with fundamental international standards, including ILO Conventions 87, 98, and 154, Article 8 of the ICESCR, and internationally recognized principles of equality and non-discrimination.