Executive Summary

This document continues the series of semi-annual reports presented by Cubalex, which analyze trends and patterns of repression employed by the Cuban state. The information compiled and processed by the organization covers the period between January 1 and June 30, 2026.

The patterns and trends described directly align with those presented in the report for the second half of 2025. The results for this semester the six trends confirm These trends indicate an intensification that exceeds expectations: the escalation of lethality in state custody; increased reactive repression of protests; expanded control over daily life; the criminalization of exercising rights; the use of incommunicado detention and mobility restrictions; and the normalization of impunity. Furthermore, new elements have emerged, such as the legal institutionalization of immigration control and the formalization of criminal proceedings in absentia against the Cuban diaspora.

In the first half of 2026, Cubalex documented 1,894 incidents involving human rights violations, averaging more than 10 violations per day—a substantial increase from the approximately 7 per day in the previous six months (1,279 incidents). This documented increase reflects both a genuine expansion of Cubalex's monitoring capacity and converging signs of intensified repression.

This increase occurred in a semester marked by an energy, water and health crisis of growing magnitude, the deepening of tensions between Cuba and the United States after the regime change in Venezuela, and an unprecedented increase in social protest —Cubalex documented 766 protests throughout the semester, and recorded in June the highest number of protests in a single month since it began documenting them in 2022—, to which the State responded with a parallel intensification of repression.

These repressive acts were documented in all 15 provinces of the country and the special municipality of Isla de la Juventud, as well as in the digital sphere and abroad (transnational/extraterritorial repression). Incidents were recorded in 141 municipalities, compared to 88 in the previous six months, reflecting that the protests and the state's repressive response reached a greater number of localities. The provinces with the highest number of reported violations were Havana (662, compared to 442 in the previous six months), Santiago de Cuba (169), and Camagüey (161), and among the municipalities, Camagüey (153), Santiago de Cuba (137), and Ciego de Ávila (96).

Cubalex identified at least 919 people (204 women and 715 men) directly affected by the repression. This period demonstrates the continuation and intensification of patterns that extend repression to unorganized sectors of the population, where the number of victims doubled compared to the previous six months: protesters, social media critics, informal workers, religious figures, conscripts of the Mandatory Military Service, and vulnerable individuals. 581% of the repressive events affected independent civil society, and 421% affected citizens without known organizational affiliation.

The high concentration of vulnerabilities among people deprived of their liberty, Afro-descendants, human rights defenders and former political prisoners, as well as an alarming number of minors, confirms that, despite the expansion of the repressive spectrum, violations continue to hit the groups historically most exposed.

Violations were recorded in 65 categories of repressive incidents (61 in the previous semester), among which the most recurrent were violations against persons deprived of liberty (762), transfers to detention centers or penitentiary establishments (318), threat or coercion (313), police surveillance operations (287), use of violence or harassment (269), arbitrary detentions (257), denial of medical care or negligence (175) and illegal or arbitrary official summonses (165).

Cubalex documented 39 potentially unlawful death events during the semester, with a total of 42 fatalities, 15 more than the 27 recorded between July and December 2025, for an increase of 56%, confirming the projected trend towards an escalation of lethality and degradation of conditions under state custody.

The report's findings corroborate that repression in Cuba is part of a systematic and predictable social control apparatus, consolidated over decades by those in power. This network directly affects civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights, and is perpetuated by the lack of investigation, prosecution, and redress in a context of chronic impunity.

I. Methodology and limitations

This analysis covers the period between January 1 and June 30, 2026, and directly follows up on the report for the second half of 2025. The data were collected by the Cubalex Monitoring team and processed, analyzed, and systematized in conjunction with the organization's Legal and Communications departments.

This report was compiled using 1,894 records, obtained primarily from Facebook posts (1,275), private messaging (326), news on websites (215), Twitter/X posts (49), Instagram (17) and YouTube (12).

The report differentiates between events (the smallest unit of recording), incidents or types of violations detected in each case, and co-occurrences. The latter refers to categories that manifest simultaneously in the same event, allowing for the identification of systematic patterns and joint repressive dynamics rather than isolated incidents.

Since May 2026, the monitoring database has linked incidents to specific records from detention centers and identified perpetrators. This variable, therefore, is not comparable with previous months of the same semester.

The increase from 1,279 to 1,894 documented events reflects, first and foremost, an expansion of monitoring capacity and an increase in direct reports. While this data demonstrates greater institutional coverage, the thesis of a real intensification of repression is validated by converging signs of severity, such as the escalation of lethality, territorial expansion, and the rise of social protest.

II. Relevant Context

The structural crisis in basic services—electricity, water, food, health—worsened steadily, generating a record increase in social protest, that the State responded with both immediate and delayed repression.

The semester was marked by an unprecedented and exceptional context: the US military incursion into Venezuela and the capture of Nicolás Maduro In January, the ensuing rhetorical and diplomatic escalation between Washington and Havana, and the deepening of a narrative of ""state of war"" by the Cuban regime, which combined military mobilization, propaganda, and internal repression.

Monthly evolution of context events by category: 591 records of violence and citizen insecurity, 343 linked to Cuba-United States relations and 277 context and repression events with the label "state of war", the latter reached its highest point in April.

The organization's monthly monitoring reveals a paradox: April, the month with the highest military mobilization and defense exercises, record the highest figure for violence and citizen insecurity of the semester. This high lethality persisted, while in June Police operations reached historic highs. The disconnect between the reality of diplomatic tensions and the increased military control—which fails to mitigate them— citizen violence— confirms Cubalex's thesisMilitarization is not due to a real external threat, but is a mechanism of social control and internal intimidation against citizens.

Within the framework of bilateral negotiations with the United States, the regime combined announcements of release from prison and pardon with the selective revocation of benefits to people already released from prison, and with the implementation of a new legal framework for migration composed of laws 171, 172 and 173, which includes the creation of a Migration Police.

III. Repressive Patterns

1. Violence, harassment, and lethality in state custody

With 762 documented incidents concerning the situation of people deprived of their liberty, Cuban prisons continue to be the environment where the greatest number and diversity of human rights violations are concentrated, including serious manifestations such as beatings, sexual assaults among inmates under orders from State Security, as well as other forms of torture and, in its most critical expression, death in custody. The denial of medical care is the category that most frequently accompanies this situation in the same event (167 co-occurrences), followed by the transfers (104), facts of violence o harassment (100), the isolation in a punishment cell (85), the hunger strike (77), lack of communication (66) and threat or coercion (67), which confirms that they are not isolated categories but expressions of the same pattern of neglect and retaliation.

This pattern of harassment includes the denial o arbitrary revocation of benefits —extra-penal licenses, parole or regime progressions—, a category that appears as one of the most recurrent in events related to persons deprived of liberty, with 43 records, which represents a alarming increase compared to 19 records in the previous semester. This trend is further compounded by indictment (27) and the systematic blocking to access to legal resources and justice (26), demonstrating a punitive instrumentalization of imprisonment. The situation of the political prisoner Yasmany González This punitive policy exemplifies her: her benefits were arbitrarily revoked despite her critical physical deterioration, severe malnutrition, and loss of teeth following the persistent institutional refusal to provide her with medical assistance.

Cubalex documented 39 cases of potentially unlawful deaths Between January and June 2026, a total of 42 people died, as one case involved four victims. This figure represents a 561% increase compared to the previous six months. Of these, 30 people (2 women and 28 men) were incarcerated.

Of these deaths, 22 are associated with lack of medical care or negligence, mainly due to severe malnutrition and untreated illnesses, such as tuberculosis, This pattern is repeated every month in different prisons. This policy of institutional neglect is tragically exemplified by the death of Ernesto Brieva Sempé, who died of severe malnutrition in the Combinado del Este prison. A similar dynamic was experienced Luis Miguel Oña Jiménez, A patient with HIV was granted a special dispensation by authorities to allow him to die at home when his health was irreversibly deteriorating. With this death, the number of 11J protesters who have died in contexts of heightened state responsibility has risen to six.

Five deaths correspond to suicides in state custody or during mandatory military service. The death of a 20-year-old inmate was particularly worrying. Authorities at the Ciego de Ávila Provincial Prison (Canaleta) claimed he hanged himself after protesting hunger, but other inmates reported that he may have been strangled after being beaten and placed in solitary confinement. subsequent mutiny It was repressed with extreme violence, and Cubalex has not been able to clarify until the closing of this report whether there were additional deaths among the prisoners transferred under conditions of enforced disappearance.

Two homicides of inmates at the hands of other prisoners were also documented, one in the Canaletas prison (Matanzas) and the other in the Ariza prison (Cienfuegos), along with five cases that remain unresolved: two deaths during mandatory military service, two while in police or prison custody, and one with unclear circumstances. Three additional cases involved individuals who were not in direct custody at the time of their deaths, but whose circumstances implicate state responsibility due to institutional negligence.

Two incidents were classified as extrajudicial executions, the most serious level of direct state responsibility documented in the semester. The largest and most impactful case of the semester was the execution of four exiles On February 25, during a confrontation with Cuban border guards as part of a maritime interception, the outcome of which also resulted in the enforced disappearance of survivors and obstacles to activating habeas corpus, without, up to the closing of this report, having occurred official and transparent clarification.

This pattern is sustained by a systematic institutional cover-up, as no death in custody has evidence of an independent, impartial, and effective investigation. Therefore, each case requires review to determine state responsibility and guarantee due process.

Starting in May, the monitoring database links incidents to records from detention centers and identified perpetrators, with the director of [unspecified institution] standing out due to the volume of incidents. Kilo 8 prison in Camagüey and its head of internal order. This new methodology allows us to verify that several officers remain in their positions after having been accused of denying medical attention or causing the deaths of inmates, further evidence that the State does not investigate or punish these violations.

2. Criminalization of protest: arbitrary arrests, transfers and delayed punishment

The first half of 2026 saw a sustained and unprecedented increase in social protest, in a context of worsening of the energy, water and health crisis: of 68 protests in February it was switched to 229 in March —the highest monthly figure up to that point since the demonstrations of July 11, 2021—, 65 in April, and 109 in May with a peak of 30 protests in a single day on May 13. In June There were 253 demonstrations, reaching a peak of 31 protests on the 19th, figures that surpassed the historical records of March and May.

The protests not only increased in number, but also in their radicalization. Traditional forms of protest—banging pots and pans, chanting slogans, posting signs, hunger strikes, and occupying public spaces—were joined by more disruptive expressions such as blocking streets and avenues, throwing stones at police stations and banks, and setting fire to garbage dumps. The most radicalized event of the semester occurred on the night of March 13th in Morón, In Ciego de Ávila, protesters occupied the municipal Communist Party headquarters, burned its furniture, and raised the Cuban flag. The slogans also became more politically charged, moving beyond economic concerns, in direct contradiction to the official narrative that attributes the discontent solely to material causes.

Note: The semester saw several peaks in public demonstrations, the first with 88 during the week of March 9, coinciding with the most radicalized episode in Morón; the second in May; and another in mid-June, accompanied by a simultaneous increase in police operations and arbitrary arrests during the same weeks. Communication disruptions were concentrated between March and May.

Havana remained the epicenter of public protest during the first half of the year, with 495 events, registering a progressive shift from the outskirts to the city center. Santiago de Cuba (81) and Matanzas (25) consolidated their positions as the second and third largest centers of mobilization. Faced with this increase in protest, the State deployed both immediate and delayed repressive measures. mass arrests at the time of the demonstrations, followed by summonses, threats, fines, and protracted criminal proceedings weeks or months later. It was also reported that use of riot police, special MININT brigades (black berets) and/or surveillance drones to suppress at least ten protests in the semester.

During the semester, 257 incidents of arbitrary detention were recorded, 701% more than in the previous semester, with at least 410 victims. Detentions and subsequent transfers, in practice, form a single pattern: they are the two categories most frequently recorded together in a single event throughout the semester, with 208 co-occurrences.

The transfer, whether from a residence to a police station, between prisons, or to State Security facilities, is frequently the first step in the process of detention. This transfer can be repeated sequentially and often leads to incommunicado detention, interrogation, or prolonged imprisonment. Cubalex recorded a total of 318 such transfers in the first half of the year, an 85% increase compared to the previous period.

The arrests They were carried out both in the context of protests—with mass and indiscriminate arrests that sometimes included minors, as in Morón and, towards the end of the semester, in Contramaestre—and individually against activists, independent journalists y citizens without political affiliation nor links with civil society organizations.

The enforced disappearance It appears as another phase of this repressive continuum: it was recorded in conjunction with the transfer on 37 occasions and with the arbitrary detention on 34, which confirms that the initial uncertainty about the whereabouts of the detained person is, in practice, a recurring and not exceptional stage of the detention process itself.

Cubalex also identified a temporal pattern in the execution of these arrests: they are more markedly concentrated (52%) between Wednesday and Friday, compared to the other days of the week. This coincides with the court recess, which, since the worsening of the energy crisis, has been extended from Friday to Sunday, hindering the filing of legal appeals and prolonging the victims' defenselessness against possible illegal arrests. The case of Yunaykis Linares This illustrates this pattern: she was subjected to 3 transfers, while the closure of the courts on a Friday prevented the filing of a habeas corpus petition in her favor to clarify her whereabouts.

Several high-profile transfers took place in Villa Marista, such as that of the athlete Javier Ernesto Martín Gutiérrez, after a short-term enforced disappearance. The recurrence of this center as a destination for transfers during the semester confirms its intimidating role in the circuit of detention, interrogation and psychological pressure of the repressive apparatus.

The arrests and transfers also had a particularly serious impact on minors, forming its own pattern within this same repressive dynamic: Jonathan David Muir Burgos and three other teenagers, Those arrested during the March protests in Morón were transferred and held in adult prisons despite being minors. Three were released in May and one remains in prison.

At least ten people, Several of them minors, were arrested in Contramaestre and transferred to the Versailles Criminal Operations and Instruction Center under accusations of "sabotage"; three minors They remain deprived of their liberty at the time of this report's closing. These events violate the enhanced protection obligations that the Cuban State must guarantee to children, including in contexts of detention or in response to social protest.

The above was combined with a increased patrolling and militarization visible in the cities, for a total of 287 police surveillance operations, an increase of 35% over the previous semester, with groups of police and military vehicles, popularly called "the combo" or "the convoy", even carrying long guns, within the framework of the official narrative of preparation for a "state of war".

After the protests of May 20, The town of Antilla, in Holguín, awoke completely militarized, with raids on homes and arrests of non-protester family members; a similar pattern of deferred containment was documented the following day in Alamar (Havana).

3. Social control through daily harassment, and restrictions on mobility and communications

Threats or coercion (313 events), official summonses (165), interrogations (99), and detention resulting from a summons (80) are not independent events, but rather stages in the same sequence: in 22 events during the semester, all four categories were recorded together, and in 4 additional cases, a formal warning was also issued. Incidents of threats or coercion increased by 871% compared to the previous semester, and official summonses increased by 511%.

A person is summoned by official notice, interrogated at a police or State Security unit, detained beyond the initial procedure, and threatened—often with the loss of benefits, imprisonment, or reprisals against their family—and in many cases, the process concludes with a warning notice, all as a form of collective pressure. The case of the content creator Anna Sofía Benítez and her mother This sequence illustrates: both were subjected to repeated summonses and interrogations as part of a sustained campaign of harassment against them.

The death threats against activists, independent journalists Political prisoners were a constant presence throughout the semester, intensified by the tension between Cuba and the United States. Guards warned political prisoners that they would be executed in the event of a US military intervention, while dissidents at large received threats to silence their criticism.

House arrest or detention, surveillance operations, and restrictions on internal movement occurred together 76 times during the semester, confirming that they constitute expressions of the same repressive practice: a single dynamic—the encirclement of a home through sustained police surveillance to prevent its occupant from leaving. This form of control was applied preventively on symbolic dates or during diplomatic visits, focusing on January, May y end of June, when activists, opposition members, journalists and relatives of political prisoners were besieged in their homes to prevent them from attending diplomatic receptions at the United States embassy or meeting with Ambassador Mike Hammer during his tour of the country.

Although not among the most frequently occurring categories, Cubalex includes communications blackouts within this category due to their structural nature as a control mechanism. Their recurrent application in contexts of protests or high public visibility, systematically combined with communication blackouts, mobility restrictions, and threats, amplifies their deterrent effect. This pattern is further exacerbated by the energy crisis: blackouts in the National Electric System and ETECSA failures simultaneously affect electricity supply and internet access, making it easier for the State to conceal selective outages under the guise of a widespread structural failure.

In April, At least 16 activists, journalists, and relatives of political prisoners reported hacking of their social media accounts and messaging applications, including the forced closure of WhatsApp accounts. These incidents point to possible coordination between ETECSA—through whose services the verification codes are received—and State Security. May concentrated the highest number of individualized cuts of the semester (22). In May y June In addition, internet service was cut off in entire neighborhoods as an immediate containment mechanism following protests in El Vedado, Diez de Octubre, Santiago de Cuba, Altamira, Santo Suárez and La Güinera.

Added to this are measures of economic persecution: selective fines under Decree Law 370 for publications on social networks or as punishment for participating in public protests, the application of bail bonds with increasingly excessive amounts, and the power granted to the ONAT to directly withdraw funds from bank accounts for tax debts, which expands the state's margin of economic pressure on citizens.

The pattern of harassment was completed with social media smear campaigns and in pro-government media against activists, journalists, and citizens detained for expressing their discontent, including attempts to portray them as people with psychiatric problems, as well as with beatings carried out outside of a formal arrest or transfer.

4. Punitive use of the legal framework, immigration control and extraterritorial repression

Fifty-three cases of formal charges were documented during the semester, 12 more than in the previous semester. The Cuban regime continued to use the legal framework as a tool to criminalize dissent, seeking prison sentences of between two and ten years for individuals for writing critical phrases, posters, or graffiti in public spaces., photographing anti-government graffiti in the street or posting political opinions on social media.

This pattern was also evident in the publication of markedly disproportionate prosecutorial requests in relation to the alleged crimes: requests for between 4 and 25 years of imprisonment were documented for offenses such as propaganda against the constitutional order, Public disorder, disobedience, or more serious offenses such as espionage and "other acts against state security." Likewise, charges of sabotage in connection with public protests continue to be filed, and worryingly, due to their frequency, against minors.

In January 2026, the participants of the November 2024 protest in Encrucijada They received sentences of between 3 and 8 years, in another example of this logic of deferred punishment. Trial against eight political prisoners from the "Cuba First" movement" It also illustrates a pattern of procedural opacity: after a first failed attempt to hold it at the end of May, the trial was finally held on June 30 inside the very prison where the accused were being held, while two of them remained in solitary confinement without having committed any indiscipline.

During this period, a strategy of criminalization targeting content creators on digital platforms was consolidated, given that the impact and virality of their complaints act as triggers for the intensity of repression. In February, authorities arrested [the following individuals] at their homes: Ernesto Ricardo Medina and Kamil Zayas Pérez, Members of the "El4tico" project, who remain in pretrial detention on charges of propaganda against the constitutional order and incitement to commit crimes. Towards the end of the semester, the comedian Eddy Ceballos He was arrested after documenting a disused military base and subsequently charged with espionage before a military court, a disproportionate charge given the documented facts. These cases confirm that the exercise of social criticism through humor or audiovisual media has become a new target for criminal prosecution, with extremely serious charges that ignore the nature of the documented events.

Throughout the semester, the Cuban regime combined public announcements of openness or easing with the simultaneous intensification of internal repression and state control, in a pattern that is repeated beyond a single category of incidents.

He announcement of the release of 51 people in March and the pardon for 2,010 sanctioned individuals in April they contrasted with the effective revocation of granted benefits, Among them are at least eleven political prisoners from the 11J attacks who were released following negotiations in January 2025. Furthermore, Yoan de la Cruz and other people whose licenses were revoked would be facing new criminal charges, which shows the fragility of these measures.

Similarly, in March the regime announced its willingness to consider compensation to U.S. citizens and companies for properties confiscated after 1959; it published a new decree-law regulating partnerships between state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises, and reported that it would allow investment by Cuban emigrants in different sectors of the economy.

During the same period, the State also published and implemented resolutions that expand its control capacity, such as the new laws on Migration, Citizenship and Foreigners, which substantially increase state control over mobility.

This pattern suggests that gestures of economic and prison openness serve a purpose in the eyes of the international community and bilateral negotiations with the United States, while in parallel, fiscal, migratory, and social control mechanisms over the population are reinforced through new regulations, without any of these gestures resulting in an effective reduction of internal repression or real guarantees for dissent.

Thus, the logic of instrumentalizing freedom extends to forced exile, which the Cuban state increasingly uses as a de facto condition for release from prison: instead of guaranteeing full freedom within the country, leaving for another country is imposed as a condition for regaining liberty. The most high-profile case was that of the political prisoner and Lady in White. Sissi Abascal Zamora, whose release from prison in May was conditional on her mother, also a Lady in White, leaving the country with her, after denying her parole seven times.

This example is included in a set of 5 cases of exile or forced expatriation with 7 victims, which Cubalex documented during the semester, plus 10 cases of proposed or threatened exile as a form of pressure without necessarily resulting in actual departure from the country, and one banishment — exercised by prevent the re-entry into the country of a Lady in White. Overall, there has been a slight increase in this practice compared to the previous semester, in which 8 cases of forced exile and 2 proposals were recorded.

Extraterritorial repression against the diaspora also became established as a pattern. On May 13, the Attorney General's Office formalized the criminal prosecution in absentia of two citizens residing in the United States, accused of terrorism while not in the country. This unprecedented event is compounded by at least a dozen incidents of threats and harassment against Cuban activists and journalists abroad. their relatives on the Island.

Cross-cutting mechanisms of repression

Profile of the victims

Among the 919 people (204 women and 715 men) identified as victims in the semester, activist Yamilka Lafita Cancio (19 events), Lady in White Berta de los Ángeles Soler Fernández (18), the opposition Roilán Álvarez Rensoler (17), the minor political prisoner Jonathan David Muir Burgos (17) and the opposition leader Ángel Juan Moya Acosta (15) suffered the most repressive acts against them.

There were 1,078 repressive events against independent civil society and 766 against citizens without known affiliation. Among civil society organizations, the highest number of victims were recorded by the Patriotic Union of Cuba (UNPACU), with 37; the Movement of Opponents for a New Republic (MONR), with 34; the United Anti-Totalitarian Forum (FANTU) and Cuba Decide, with 21 each; and the Ladies in White, with 19.

At least fourteen vulnerabilities were identified among the victims, and these were not mutually exclusive. The most frequent were being incarcerated (412), of African descent (296), and a human rights defender (244), followed by being a former political prisoner (69). In addition, direct violations against 20 minors at the time of the events were documented, an alarming number.

The age range of the victims during this period extends from 1 to 81 years. The most represented age group is 20 years old, with 15 people, followed by a broad age group between 19 and 45 years old, comprising between 8 and 11 victims each. This confirms that repression particularly affects young and middle-aged adults, the segment most active in social protest, activism, and the production of critical content.

VICTIMS WITH THE MOST INCIDENTS

Yamilka Lafita Cancio

19 events

Berta de los Ángeles Soler Fernández

18 events

Roilán Álvarez Rensoler

17 events

Jonathan David Muir Burgos

17 events

Angel Juan Moya Acosta

15 events

IV. Cross-cutting human rights violations

All documented repressive practices violate multiple rights, some of them repeatedly:

1. Right to life: violated in the 39 events of potentially unlawful deaths, resulting from medical negligence, inhumane detention conditions, institutional abandonment and unclarified violent circumstances, without effective investigations or assumption of state responsibility.
2. Right to personal integrity: violated through beatings, police violence, overcrowding, poor nutrition and deliberate denial of medical care.
3. Right to liberty and personal security: violated in the 257 documented arbitrary detentions, house arrests and deprivations of liberty without effective judicial control, sometimes with short-term enforced disappearance.
4. Right to due process: violated through politically motivated judicial processes without minimum guarantees, including prosecution in absentia of citizens residing abroad.
5. Right to freedom of expression and information: violated through arrests, criminal proceedings and sanctions for critical opinions, selective cuts to communications and hacking for surveillance and censorship purposes.
6. Right to peaceful assembly, association and protest: violated through the direct repression of protests that reached record numbers, and their deferred punishment through exemplary sentences.
7. Right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion: affected by the harassment of religious leaders with critical positions.
8. Right to freedom of movement: violated through house arrests, sieges of homes to impede diplomatic activities, and the practice of preventing the re-entry into the country of people returning from abroad.
9. Right to remain, leave and return to one's own country: violated in at least 6 cases of forced exile or banishment, and through the new legal framework for migration.
10. Right to the protection of private and family life: violated by threats and reprisals against relatives of persecuted people.
11. Children's rights and enhanced child protection: violated through the confinement of minors in adult prisons and the use of threats against their custody as a form of pressure.
12. Right to an effective remedy and to the truth: breached by the refusal of courts to accept habeas corpus appeals and the lack of clarification of cases such as the maritime interception of February.

V. Identified Trends

The six trends confirm and deepen, without exception, those projected in the second semi-annual report of 2025, and reflect the structural, comprehensive, and expanding nature of repression in Cuba, with a shift toward mechanisms that combine direct violence, legal control, and psychological attrition in a context of sustained impunity. If the conditions that give rise to these trends—crisis in basic services, geopolitical tension, and lack of accountability—are not reversed, it is foreseeable that they will persist or intensify during the second half of 2026.

1. Escalation of lethality and degradation of state custody conditions: critical deterioration of prison infrastructure and increase in preventable deaths due to medical negligence and unsanitary conditions, accompanied by the repressive use of revoking benefits for sick inmates.
2. Reactive and delayed repression in the face of the radicalization of social protest: This model consolidates a system of containment and adaptation to increased citizen confrontation through mass arrests during protests, with a worrying impact on minors, followed by exemplary sentences months later. It relies on restricting access to justice: the court recess due to the energy crisis prevents the timely filing of legal appeals and prolongs the period of legal defenselessness.
3. Consolidation of everyday social control through lack of communication, restriction, and economic strangulation: normalization of selective internet shutdowns and digital censorship (taking advantage of the energy crisis), combined with police cordons and direct tax sanctions to neutralize public articulation.
4. Sustained contrast between official gestures of openness and selective revocation (double discourse): Coexistence of propaganda announcements of pardons and mass releases for the international community with the revocation of benefits for political prisoners.
5. Expansion of the legal-migration framework and institutionalization of extraterritorial repression: Increased control of mobility through immigration reform and the Immigration Police, coupled with the use of criminal proceedings in absentia to intimidate activists in the diaspora.
6. Exploiting the geopolitical context to criminalize critical expression: use of the official narrative of "state of war" to justify the militarization of public space, intensify surveillance and impute extremely serious crimes, such as espionage, for the publication of critical content.

VI. Semiannual Comparison

Between January 1 and June 30, 2026, 1,894 human rights violations were documented nationwide, a 481% increase compared to the previous six months. The data reveal an intensification of the repressive patterns and trends systematically employed by the Cuban state and its repressive apparatus to maintain its grip on power, amidst growing internal social pressure and external geopolitical tension.

The following tables show continuity and change between July–December 2025 and January–June 2026. They compare general indicators, territorial reach, categories of repression, and victim profiles. The figures should be interpreted with the methodological caution outlined in the executive summary: the increase reflects both broader monitoring coverage and converging signs of intensified repression.

Overall, the comparison shows that the patterns of the previous semester were not reversed. Documented events, municipal coverage, arbitrary arrests, transfers, threats, and violations against people deprived of their liberty all increased. The most significant change is not merely quantitative: repression more frequently targeted people without political affiliation, was more directly linked to protests over living conditions, and had more serious consequences for those in state custody.

VII. Conclusions

The results for the first half of 2026 reflect a marked intensification of the structural mechanisms through which repression operates in Cuba, with a 481% increase in incidents and a 181% increase in victims compared to the previous period. This period fully confirmed the trends projected for 2025, which revolve around four main patterns: lethal violence in custody (+561% in deaths), repression of social protest, comprehensive social control, and the instrumentalization of legal, migratory, and propaganda measures.

Faced with the surge in protests fueled by the material crisis, the state resorted to a strategy of immediate containment and delayed punishment. It also exploited the geopolitical tensions stemming from the capture of Nicolás Maduro and US pressure on the Cuban regime to increase surveillance and threats against dissent.

Within the prison system, violence and preventable deaths due to medical negligence persisted in a context of absolute impunity, while repression expanded beyond national borders through criminal proceedings in absentia. Furthermore, a double official discourse coexisted, combining announcements of pardons with the revocation of benefits for political prisoners and increased control over movement through a new immigration framework. Finally, censorship of critical expression on social media and the targeting of minors became entrenched as mechanisms of pressure—trends that are likely to continue if the crisis in basic services and the lack of accountability persist.

VIII. Recommendations

Based on the information gathered during the period, its analysis and comparison with previous semesters, the Cubalex team makes the following recommendations:

• To the Cuban State: immediately cease repressive practices; release persons deprived of their liberty for political reasons; and ensure prompt, independent, impartial, effective and transparent investigations into potentially unlawful deaths and other documented violations, including conditions of detention, institutional violence and due process violations.
• To the international community and multilateral organizations: to condition cooperation, political dialogue and agreements with the Cuban State on compliance with verifiable commitments in the area of human rights, and to adopt specific diplomatic and protection measures against the legal, migratory and extraterritorial instrumentalization of repression, in particular against the harassment of minors, criminal prosecutions in absentia against the diaspora and the practices of forced exile and banishment.
• To the States and actors with the capacity to influence the Cuban State: adopt specific diplomatic and protection measures in favor of human rights defenders, independent journalists and people persecuted for political reasons.
• To civil society organizations, political opposition organizations, and independent media: Strengthen the documentation, analysis and reporting of human rights violations, as well as coordination between actors inside and outside the country.
• To the victims and their families: systematically document the events suffered, preserve available evidence and seek support from independent human rights organizations.

IX. Proposals for future research

• Extraterritorial repression against the Cuban diaspora: Investigate the use of criminal law as an instrument of intimidation against Cuban citizens residing abroad.
• Custodial conditions and state responsibility in preventable deaths: To deepen the analysis of the material, sanitary and medical and psychological care conditions in prison contexts and the Compulsory Military Service, given the number of deaths of young recruits documented in the semester.
• Identification of those responsible for deaths and disappearances under reinforced state responsibility: Systematize data on state agents responsible (directly or by omission) for deaths and disappearances in custody, document the chain of command and monitor the absence of independent investigations, to support advocacy actions, strategic litigation or complaints before international human rights mechanisms.

X. Acknowledgments

The preparation of this report was made possible by the courage, commitment, and perseverance of those inside Cuba who face extremely adverse conditions in documenting and denouncing human rights violations. We are deeply grateful to the human rights defenders, activists, journalists, and citizens who collaborated in gathering information. We especially recognize the Cubalex monitoring and research team, whose work is fundamental to building a solid base of evidence. We extend our gratitude to our partner organizations and all those who contributed significantly to the preparation of this report.