On July 10, 2026, the National Assembly of People's Power (ANPP) public The Assembly published the Personal Identity and Domicile System Bill on its official website and opened an email address to gather public feedback. According to the Assembly itself, the law aims to recognize and protect the identity of Cuban citizens and foreign residents on the island, as well as register and update their addresses.
Formulated this way, the objective sounds reasonable. In a democratic country, with independent courts and real guarantees for human rights, mModernizing an identity registry should not cause alarm. But that's not the context on the island.
In Cuba, police surveillance, arbitrary arrests, restrictions on freedom of movement, hacking of social media accounts, identity theft, and the dissemination of private information to discredit journalists, activists, opposition members, and human rights defenders are not isolated incidents: they are a sustained, systematic, and widespread practice, widely documented.
The analysis of this project starts precisely from that reality, and is confirmed by examining three central elements: the magnitude of the system to be created, the quantity and type of data that the responsible authority will concentrate along with its administrative powers, and the lack of effective safeguards to limit the storage and use of that information. Hence the question that runs throughout the document: can this system strengthen the architecture of surveillance and social control that already exists in Cuba today?
When the body becomes state data
The Cuban state has been digitizing its records and centralizing civil data for years. What changes with this project is not the intention, but the scale and technical capacity. The proposal expands both the volume and sensitivity of the data collected and integrates it into a centralized, automated, and interoperable system. The real leap forward lies not only in how much data is stored, but in the ability to link it together.
The mechanism works as follows: each person will be assigned a unique, unrepeatable, and unchangeable identity number, which will identify them in all public registries. Since this number will be repeated in every registry, it will act as a master key capable of consolidating, under a single profile, information currently scattered across different offices: birth, address, digital identity, physical characteristics. The law also stipulates that these registries will communicate with each other, without establishing clear limits on this exchange of information or specifying under what circumstances it is permissible or not.
To that master key New body features are now being added —face, voice and iris— which multiply the ways of recognizing a person. The system no longer serves only to verify who someone is, but expands the possibilities of identifying them, cross-referencing their data, and monitoring them.
There is another significant change at the regulatory level: the bill elevates the biometric catalog of the identification system to the status of law. Currently, the existing regulations—which this proposal seeks to repeal—already allow for the incorporation of photographs and fingerprints, but they do so through provisions issued by the Ministry of the Interior (MININT), which facilitates their modification. By enshrining this data in law, any future changes would require a new legislative process and the approval of the National Assembly, which in practice makes it difficult to correct or eliminate them later.
The project converts existing categories into expressly recordable data and adds new ones: face or facial features, voice, iris, skin color, eye color, and height.
The collection and use of biometric data must adhere to strict criteria of necessity, proportionality, minimization, and transparency: the State must justify why it needs each piece of data and demonstrate that there is no less intrusive alternative that infringes on people's rights. A centralized database such as the one proposed also requires enhanced security measures, data segregation, access logging, independent oversight, impact assessments, and non-biometric alternatives to prevent a technical failure or refusal to provide this data from ultimately limiting access to rights and services.
None of this appears in the recently published text. The bill does not explain why photographs and fingerprints—already in use—would be insufficient, nor why it is necessary to add features such as voice or iris scans. It also fails to establish retention periods or regulate deletion, despite the fact that this data is irreversible: unlike a password, a face, a voice, or an iris cannot be replaced if it is leaked or compromised by a cyberattack. Its exposure can be permanent, with risks of impersonation, surveillance, discrimination, financial fraud, and other misuses that compromise the privacy, identity, assets, and personal security of the person who possesses this data and their immediate circle. The absence of limits reduces the possibility of demanding accountability and expands the scope for abuse of power., arbitrariness and cybercrimes.
From showing your ID to being recognized without knowing it
The difference between the various types of biometric data lies not only in what is collected, but also in how it can be used. Fingerprints typically require a conscious, in-person action by the individual. Faces and voices, on the other hand, can be captured and compared remotely—using cameras, photographs, or recordings—without the person's involvement and, in many cases, without their even being aware they are being identified.
Precisely because of that risk, the European Union Artificial Intelligence Act It strictly restricts real-time remote biometric identification, allowing exceptions only for the prosecution of serious crimes and with prior judicial approval. The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), on the other hand, provides enhanced protection for biometric data used to uniquely identify an individual.
The Cuban project does not explicitly create a real-time facial or voice recognition system, but it does incorporate the data that could feed one, without setting clear limits for its subsequent use. It does not require conscious biometric identification, does not require judicial authorization to compare faces or voices with other databases, and does not expressly prohibit its remote, mass, or indiscriminate use. This leaves the door open to moving from in-person identification—showing an ID card—to remote recognition, without the person's involvement or even their knowledge.
Who watches and who controls the watcher
The project centralizes the identity system within the Ministry of the Interior, granting it the power to investigate, monitor, deport, and restrict movement, without oversight from an independent judiciary. This contradicts the principles of separation of powers and the right to effective judicial protection. The Ministry of the Interior would manage the central registry, certify digital identity, request information from public and private entities, impose sanctions, and would also be primarily responsible for reviewing appeals against its own decisions.
International standards are clear on this point: systems that handle biometric data must be subject to independent oversight. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has warned Because of their capacity to expand state surveillance, these systems require external, impartial, and effective controls.
The Project does not create any independent authority with the power to audit the system, investigate abuses, or hold the Ministry of the Interior (MININT) accountable. And although it contemplates the possibility of later resorting to the courts, this avenue does not represent a real counterweight in the Cuban context, given the lack of judicial independence. The result is that the MININT would simultaneously be administrator, supervisor, and primary auditor of its own actions: the entity that concentrates power over the population's identity would also be, to a large extent, responsible for monitoring itself.
The panoptic risk in the Cuban context
Any centralized biometric infrastructure poses risks, in any country. In Cuba, these risks are exacerbated by the concentration of state power, the absence of independent courts, and the documented history of surveillance, digital censorship, interception of communications, physical tracking, and systematic and widespread harassment—particularly against journalists, activists, opposition members, and human rights defenders—practices documented by organizations such as Cubalex.
Even without continuous and effective surveillance, the mere fact of knowing that the State can identify, locate and link people can generate self-censorship and inhibit the exercise of fundamental rights such as protest, freedom of expression and freedom of movement.
The project The Ministry of the Interior (MININT) stores biometric data, address, digital identity, a unique identification number, and access to interconnected records.. This combination can be used to track movements, reconstruct personal relationships, create profiles, identify those participating in protests, and expand targeted surveillance. The pressing question is what happens when the same agency that manages this data also investigates crimes and participates in gathering evidence. Without prior and effective judicial oversight, without sufficient traceability, and without a real possibility of verifying the information with independent expert analysis, the risk increases that data will be improperly incorporated or manipulated within criminal investigation files.
The missing guarantees
A law that respects human rights cannot depend on trust in authority; it needs to establish its own limits. To conform to international standards on this matter, this bill should:
- Justify the need for each piece of biometric data that you intend to collect.
- Expressly limit the uses that can be given to that information.
- Explicitly prohibit remote, mass, or indiscriminate identification.
- Set clear deadlines for data retention and deletion.
- Record each access to the stored information.
- Ensure non-biometric and non-digital alternatives for those who cannot or do not want to provide this data.
- Create an autonomous, independent and impartial authority, with real powers to audit the system, investigate abuses, address complaints and demand accountability from the MININT.
Without these guarantees, the proposed identity system would not only fulfill an administrative function: it could become an additional tool for surveillance and social control, in the hands of a State that has already demonstrated its willingness to use personal information against those who exercise their rights.