Executive Summary

July deepened the multidimensional crisis gripping Cuba, where the collapse of essential services, a surge in social violence, and escalating state repression converged in a month marked by the fifth anniversary of the July 11, 2021 protests and the official July 26 commemorations. All of this unfolded against a backdrop of economic reforms accompanied by rising prices and shortages, and an official narrative of war in the face of renewed international sanctions.

Cubalex documented 199 public protests, a decrease from the record set in June. These protests were concentrated in Havana and consisted mostly of pot-banging demonstrations related to power outages that lasted for several days and the lack of potable water for three months in outlying areas of the capital. Citizen violence reached its highest point since 2022, with 37 homicides, 9 femicides, and 4 suicides—a scenario that reveals the fragility of public security and an underreporting of the mental health crisis.

In terms of repression, the month saw 388 events and 817 incidents of harassment affecting 302 people, a notable increase despite the drop in the number of protests. The State deployed an increasingly preventive strategy, based on surveillance, arbitrary summonses, and mobility restrictions against activists and human rights defenders; the peaks of repression coincided with politically sensitive dates rather than with the days of greatest protest. Three deaths in custody, fifteen short-term enforced disappearances, and the forced exile of political prisoner Luis Manuel Otero Alcántara were documented.,

Context

The situation identified in July reveals the ongoing energy, water, and health crises, resulting in a systematic deterioration of material conditions that prevent people from enjoying an adequate standard of living. Furthermore, the State's lack of political will to respect and guarantee fundamental rights and freedoms persisted, severely impacting the civilian population.

Despite the decrease in the volume of protests compared to all-time record for June, These were the most frequent events, along with acts of violence and citizen insecurity, for the second consecutive month. Coinciding with the fifth anniversary of the protests of July 11, 2021, and with the official events of July 26, the highest number of [number of events] was recorded. militarization of civilian life since this trend was identified in February.

Cubalex monitored 199 public protests during July, averaging more than six per day, a decrease from the 253 documented in June. These protests were concentrated toward the end of the month, coinciding with several consecutive days of prolonged power outages. The peak for the month was recorded on July 24. 25 events in a single day, while on July 11 there were 15, including 2 in prisons.

Havana continues to be the epicenter of social protest, by a wide margin, registering 160 of these events, The protests were most concentrated in the municipalities of Diez de Octubre, San Miguel del Padrón, and Centro Habana. Santiago de Cuba remains the second hotspot, followed by Villa Clara. The predominant form of protest was banging pots and pans, often accompanied by burning trash and, to a lesser extent, partial road closures or blockades. Anti-government graffiti was less frequent, with slogans against the system and the country's leadership appearing instead.

Anti-government graffiti in Santiago de Cuba. Source: José Daniel Ferrer / Facebook

In July, 168 incidents of violence and citizen insecurity were recorded, including 37 homicides., the highest number since Cubalex began its monitoring in 2022. At least nine of the deaths were femicides, in a context of vulnerability exacerbated by women's evident vulnerability to extreme gender-based violence and the lack of effective state protection mechanisms. Four suicides were also recorded, the highest number this year, indicating an underreporting of the mental health crisis in the country.

The remaining incidents were mostly robberies and violent assaults, primarily targeting vehicles and electrical generating equipment, and carried out by individuals armed with machetes and firearms. The almost daily deployment of the state defense and security apparatus focused on containing the protests over the blackouts rather than responding to the persistent increase in violence.

The documented situation reveals a systematic failure of the State to guarantee the civilian population's right to a dignified life. A sustained pattern of collapse in essential public service infrastructure is observed, depriving communities of regular and continuous access to vital supplies such as electricity and drinking water. These events were characterized by their extreme duration and structural nature: in addition to three total disconnections of the National Power Grid during the month, local blackouts lasting for consecutive days were recorded, and some outlying areas of Havana went three months without drinking water.

The Cuban healthcare system faces a profound crisis, evidenced by reports of power outages, inadequate medical care, and critical negligence in vital services. Serious situations have been reported, including shortages of supplies for dialysis treatments, dire conditions in neonatal units, and a lack of hygiene in healthcare facilities, severely compromising the state's ability to protect citizens' lives.

Government inaction in the face of the collapse of community and sanitation services, reflected in the accumulation of garbage and the deterioration of hospitals, exposes the population to serious environmental and public health risks, consolidating an environment of widespread material deprivation and constant violations of economic, social, cultural and environmental rights.

This structural precariousness is exacerbated by the ineffectiveness of state policies, runaway inflation, and lack of guarantees regarding labor rights, These factors together push large sectors of vulnerable citizens, including the elderly and minors, to resort to extreme survival strategies.

As part of the 176 economic measures, The government implemented a new budgeted salary scale, high-denomination banknotes, higher limits on electronic banking, and targeted subsidies for 1.4 million vulnerable people. However, salary delays of up to six months persisted, along with long lines of pensioners, and the rise in the dollar and the prices of basic goods (oil, coal, liquefied gas). Furthermore, the elimination of 92,000 state positions due to restructuring was announced.

The Assembly approved a new Labor Code, the Housing Law, the Law on the Organization of the Central State Administration and the Law of the Personal Identity and Domicile System, Along with decrees on wages, foreign investment, and cooperatives, the government announced the authorization of previously prohibited economic activities, including the upcoming opening of the first private currency exchange and the authorization for over one hundred private companies to sell fuel wholesale, new gas tariffs, and measures against businesses that refuse transfers.

In the context of OFAC's expansion of sanctions against two Cuban citizens and nine entities linked to the regime, the departure of international partners continued, including European hotel chains such as Meliá, Iberostar, and Barceló, resulting in the closure of 73% from Cuba's hotel stock. The restructuring of GAESA's assets through transfers to foreign investors was also documented.

The National Defense Days—with visits by Díaz-Canel and Manuel Marrero to military zones—and the presidential tour of Havana neighborhoods confirmed that the economic reforms coincide with increased control and the continuation of a "state of war" narrative. In his speeches, Díaz-Canel affirmed that his government "is not afraid" of a war with the United States, Bruno Rodríguez labeled the sanctions "collective punishment," and Carlos Fernández de Cossío rejected the notion that the Cuban political system is being negotiated.

The United States began distributing the $100 million package via Caritas, in parallel with the arrival of shipments of food, medical supplies, solar kits and donations from various sources and organizations such as Open Arms, marred by at least two reports of diversion or resale of those donations in Granma.

Harassment incidents

The Cubalex monitoring team recorded 388 repressive events in July, 69 more than in June (319), despite the decrease in social protests compared to the previous month. This increase suggests that the repression was not only a response to the volume of protests, but also to the heightened surveillance surrounding the fifth anniversary of 11J.

The events occurred in 51 municipalities distributed in 15 provinces and the Isle of Youth. The provinces with the highest number of events were Havana (191), Camagüey (39) and Santiago de Cuba (27); among the municipalities, Camagüey (37), Guanabacoa (34) and Diez de Octubre (29).

These incidents affected at least 302 people, almost 50 more than in June: 58 women and 244 men. Political prisoners were among the victims with the most recorded incidents during the month. Danisbel Labrada Morales (7 incidents), Amaury Díaz García y Luis Manuel Otero Alcántara with 6 each.

In July, the repressive events predominantly impacted people linked to opposition organizations or independent civil society (58% of the victims), compared to a 41,0% of people with no known political or organizational ties, while the affiliation of the rest could not be verified. The proportion again leans toward activism compared to June, consistent with the increased surveillance associated with the anniversary of 9/11 and with extreme mobilization to prevent attendance at an official reception for the 250th anniversary of the independence of the United States. The most affected vulnerable groups were incarcerated individuals, human rights defenders, and people of African descent.¹

The 388 repressive events included 817 incidents of harassment², grouped into 52 categories. Three categories remained the most frequent compared to June, but all increased: violations against persons deprived of their liberty (161), police surveillance or monitoring operations (98, almost double the previous month), and transfers (64). Incidents of threats or coercion (54), violence or harassment (48), illegal or arbitrary official summonses (38), and restrictions on internal movement (38) also increased. Forty-four arbitrary detentions were recorded, with a total underreporting of 77 victims: in 10 of these incidents, more than one person was detained. Fifteen cases of enforced disappearance, 17 interrogations, and 15 detentions resulting from official summonses were also documented.

People with the highest number of violations

Danisbel Labrada Morales

7 incidents

Amaury Díaz García

6 incidents

Luis Manuel Otero Alcántara

6 incidents

Analysis of the incidents verified during the month reveals several patterns that go beyond isolated events. In July, a predominantly preventative strategy became evident: instead of simply reacting to demonstrations, the State uses de facto house arrest, arbitrary summonses, and restrictions on internal movement to neutralize and isolate members of independent civil society during periods of heightened political sensitivity.

Threats or coercion serve to reinforce other forms of repression, and appear combined with interrogations, detentions resulting from official summonses, official summonses, and the condition of being a person deprived of liberty.

This control machinery, which transcends borders through extraterritorial repression, also relied on strict management of the flow of information, where selective and targeted telecommunications cuts act to isolate human rights defenders and citizens and prevent their civic organization.

Unlike June, which was characterized by more direct and reactive repression, in July the peaks of repression coincided with politically sensitive dates, not necessarily with the highest volume of protests. On those specific days, surveillance was directed individually against people identified as part of independent civil society. In contrast, during protests, repressive incidents—which Cubalex records as a single event—can affect more people in a community, whose identification is hampered by censorship, a lack of citizen organization, and other forms of harassment such as threats. On July 7, for example, at least 24 people were detained during a protest in the Luyanó neighborhood, and none have been identified to date.

Most arbitrary arrests did not coincide with an ongoing protest, indicating a delayed strategy of targeting previously identified individuals, sometimes days after the event that prompted the arrests. Furthermore, nearly half of the police surveillance operations occurred on the same day and in the same municipality as the pot-banging protests, a pattern confirmed by their concentration in Havana (72) and, to a lesser extent, in Santiago de Cuba (8). Eight internet outages were documented during the month—twice as many as in June—including one during a protest in Jatibonico.

Some arbitrary arrests this month resulted in pretrial detention or criminal prosecution. Such was the case of Lismani Acosta Gómez, arrested on July 6 during a pot-banging protest in Guanabacoa, and subjected to successive bail amounts of 100,000 and then 50,000 pesos before being transferred to the Cuba-Panama prison, which shows that These measures continued to operate as a mechanism of economic pressure. The arrest of a 13-year-old boy, beaten by the police during a protest in Boyeros, in addition to two other unidentified minors, detained in protests in Regla and Arroyo Naranjo.

On July 2, State Security deployed a simultaneous operation against at least 25 activists and opposition members in different provinces, in order to prevent them from attending the reception organized by the United States Embassy for the anniversary of their independence. The documented methods included home surveillance, sometimes combined with internet cuts for activists and independent journalists, as well as arrests and official summonses that resulted in detentions, as in the case of Anna Sofía Benítez. In the week leading up to July 11, a similar pattern of surveillance and restricted movement was repeated against other activists and former political prisoners.

Anna Sofía Benítez leaving an 11-hour interrogation. Source: ADN Cuba / Video capture

July 2nd marked the beginning of a repressive cycle against human rights defenders and former political prisoners José Elías González Agüero, Alexander Díaz Rodríguez and Mario Alberto Hernández Leyva. The first two were arrested to prevent them from attending the aforementioned reception., suffering three days of incommunicado detention, beatings, forced nudity, and death threats with firearms. Hernández Leyva, for his part, was beaten at a police station and taken to Artemisa, where he was stripped naked, photographed, and returned to Havana. The harassment continued throughout the month. were summoned Again on July 8; González Agüero's family was threatened to prevent him from leaving his house on the 11th; and Hernández Leyva suffered new arrests on July 10 and 12, house surveillance, detentions of up to 24 hours and threats.

Another serious incident occurred on July 7, when the artist and political prisoner Luis Manuel Otero Alcántara He was taken from Guanajay prison, Two days before completing his sentence, he disappeared without communicating his whereabouts to his close circle for several days. At Cubalex's request, the UN Committee against Enforced Disappearances activated an Urgent Action. Meanwhile, a court in Havana obstructed and delayed a habeas corpus appeal in his favor without justification. He remained detained in a State Security House until July 18, when he left for the United States in forced exile. Four days after his expulsion, the court dismissed the habeas corpus petition, Meanwhile, pro-government media launched a smear campaign against him.

This same logic of using immigration control to keep dissenters out of Cuba, instead of resolving their situation within the country, was also evident in the case of Agustín Lopez Canino, whom the Cuban regime prevented from re-entering the country upon his return from a visit to Miami.

Luis Manuel Otero Alcántara arrives in Miami, forced into exile after serving five years in prison. Source: Carlos Armando TV / Instagram

Taken together, these events solidified a pattern of abuses perpetrated by state agents, characterized by the use of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, extreme coercion, and the systematic practice of enforced disappearances of a temporary and punitive nature. The persistence of this alarming pattern of institutional violence and lack of protection constitutes a serious threat to the right to life and to the physical and psychological integrity of citizens.

These cases also corroborated the subordination of the judiciary to the interests of the Executive. The courts unjustifiably delay the resolution of fundamental legal remedies such as habeas corpus, rendering them meaningless and ineffective, thus guaranteeing impunity for arbitrary arrests and incommunicado detention. This calculated judicial inaction facilitates the use of imprisonment and temporary disappearances as coercive mechanisms to force dissidents into exile.

During the month, 5 cases of revocation of prison benefits and 7 releases were documented, most after fully serving their 5-year sentence for the 11J attacks: Nilo Abrahante Santiago, Aníbal Yasiel Palau Jacinto and Kevin Damián Frómeta Castro. Opposition leader Ángel Castro Carrera was released on parole.

In the prison system, the State continues to flagrantly fail in its duty to protect the people in its custody, resulting in preventable deaths attributable to severe medical negligence. Three deaths in custody were recorded during July: at the Guantánamo Provincial Prison, Jorge Luis Iglesia Rodríguez, who was infected with tuberculosis, and Rolando Yunior Rodríguez Torres, after a month hospitalized after being poisoned and not receiving timely medical attention; and in the Combinado del Este, Osviel Rivero Viera, after almost two years detained.

The state's prison management reveals a pattern of punishment and reprisals that openly contravenes international human rights standards, including the Nelson Mandela Rules. Harassment of the prison population operates as an institutionalized practice that employs unjustified solitary confinement, overcrowding, and the deliberate deprivation of basic needs—including access to clean water and adequate food—as methods of physical and psychological torture.

The persistence of a deliberate strategy of denying healthcare is particularly alarming. This intentional violation of the right to health and the lack of effective legal recourse drive incarcerated individuals to desperate measures such as hunger strikes or self-harm as a last resort to protest the degrading conditions of their confinement.

Incidents were documented in 75 different repressive centers, significantly more than the 55 in June. The Kilo 8 Special Prison, in Camagüey, remains the center with the highest concentration of incidents (29 events), followed by the Combinado del Este in Havana (18), the Las Tunas Provincial Prison "El Típico Nuevo" (10), the Valle Grande Prison (8), and the Provincial of Holguín and Guanajay Prison, with 7 each.

As in previous months, multiple violations against the same person deprived of liberty were concentrated. The punitive transfer coincided with the denial of medical attention in 28 cases, and with confinement in isolation in 25. Furthermore, of the 25 incidents linked to hunger and/or thirst strikes, Of the 19 incidents involving individuals, 23 occurred in detention centers. In other words, when a person deprived of their liberty is the victim of an incident, it tends to be combined with other violations, as in the cases of Roilán Álvarez Rensoler y Danisbel Labrada Morales, who began hunger strikes in the Holguín Provincial Prison and in Kilo 8, respectively.

At Kilo 8 prison, transfers and solitary confinement were more frequent. a documented pattern of retaliation against signatories of a collective complaint letter presented at the prison.

In the Combinado del Este prison, in addition to a death in custody, repeated reports of water shortages and the deterioration of the political prisoner's health were documented. Javier Ernesto Martín Gutiérrez ("Spiderman"), who reported vomiting, diarrhea and aggravated kidney problems, as well as the incommunicado detention of a foreign inmate.

In El Típico, the following persisted repeated denial of medical care with special risk for older adults, Poor food, overcrowding, and a four-year prison sentence requested by the prosecution against the political prisoners of July 11th. Norberto and Luis Alberto Dorta Sánchez, who were due to finish serving their sentence this month.

Fifty-nine different perpetrators were identified in 55 of the 388 repressive events. The most frequently implicated was Leonardo Suárez Reyes, director of the Kilo 8 prison, who was implicated in six incidents—including instructing sympathetic inmates to intimidate political prisoners with knives—confirming the persistence of the same pattern of direct responsibility already documented by Cubalex in May and June.